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Student learning in introductory science, technology, engineering, and mathematics 
(STEM) courses is often self-regulated. For self-regulated learning to be effective, students need 
to engage in accurate metacognitive monitoring in order to make appropriate metacognitive 
control decisions. However, the accuracy with which individuals’ monitor their task performance 
appears to largely overlap with their ability to perform that task. Two overarching goals motivate 
this dissertation and are explored over three studies. The first goal is to examine differences in 
both the initial metacognitive accuracy and the change in metacognitive accuracy over time to 
identify the trajectories in the accuracy of students’ metacognitive monitoring over the course of 
a semester. The second goal for the dissertation is to explore the effect that viewing animated-
narrated solution videos has on metacognitive monitoring accuracy for students enrolled in 
introductory physics courses.  
The first study examines the relationship between domain ability and metacognitive 
calibration within the domain, and proposes a measure to examine metacognitive awareness. The 
second study investigates the trajectories in the accuracy of students’ metacognitive monitoring 
over the course of a semester. In addition, this study explores the effect that providing students 
with feedback about their metacognitive accuracy. By exploring the constructs related to 
accurate metacognitive monitoring, these two studies aim to identify the characteristics of 
students whose metacognitive judgments do not align with their ability before the first exam in 
order to design appropriate interventions so that these students do not find themselves in a hole 
from which they cannot recover. Besides identifying students at risk of overconfidence, 
understanding the role that academic goal orientations and epistemological beliefs play in 
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making metacognitive judgments is crucial for designing effective interventions aimed at 
preparing students for exams. The results from these two studies indicate that low-performing 
students are less accurate at predicting their exam grades both before and after exams, and that 
these students tend to be aware that their initial predictions were overconfident, but they lack the 
awareness to sufficiently adjust their predictions after taking the exams. In addition, while most 
students do not improve their metacognitive calibration over the course of a semester, some 
students are able to improve the accuracy of their predictions. However, providing students with 
feedback may lead to greater overconfidence for low-performing students. 
The third study presents the results from three experiments that investigate the effect that 
viewing solution videos on problem-solving has on metacognitive calibration of low-performing 
students. The results indicate that students learn from the solution videos and make more 
accurate confidence judgments for problems that are similar to the problems in the video 
solutions, however these students are overconfident after attempting transfer problems. In 
addition, attempting the problems before viewing the solutions does not seem to benefit low-
performing students, and may lead to unwarranted overconfidence for very difficult problems. 
As a whole, the three studies presented within this dissertation investigate metacognitive 
monitoring within self-regulated learning environments, specifically introductory STEM 
classrooms. The findings extend existing research concerning differences in metacognitive 
awareness and accuracy, changes in metacognitive calibration over time, and the effect that 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Problem Statement 
 Learning within authentic contexts such as introductory science, technology, engineering, 
and mathematics (STEM) courses is considered self-regulated because students are active 
participants who largely control how they interact with their course material (Tuysuzoglu & 
Greene, 2015). This is particularly true for course homework and when studying for exams as 
these activities typically occur outside of the classroom. Because students actively control their 
learning in these contexts, success within introductory STEM courses is largely due to the 
effectiveness with which a student is able to engage in self-regulated learning, a process that 
relies on students to engage in effective metacognitive monitoring and control processes (Greene 
& Azevedo, 2007; Winne & Hadwin, 1998; Zimmerman, 2008). 
 Imagine a student who has several exams to prepare for over the next two weeks in 
multiple courses. This student must determine how to allocate their time studying to maximize 
their performance across all of the classes. To prepare effectively for their upcoming exams, the 
student needs to consider which courses will require more of their time to study, as well as 
determine the topics on which they should focus. Students need to know how their current 
knowledge compares to course expectations, what their academic goals are for each course, and 
the amount of time it will take to learn the subject material. In other words, the student needs to 
engage in metacognitive monitoring to make judgments about their current ability level, or 
knowledge state, for each course and for each topic within the courses. After making a 
metacognitive judgment about their current state, the student uses their epistemological beliefs 
(i.e., knowledge and beliefs about the nature of learning), their metacognitive knowledge (i.e., 
knowledge of, and beliefs about, potential cognitive strategies), and their academic goal 
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orientations (i.e., course specific performance or mastery goals) to plan and enact a study 
strategy. Along with their academic goals for the course, the effectiveness of their study 
strategies relies on the accuracy of their metacognitive knowledge and monitoring, their beliefs 
about the speed at which learning can occur, and their beliefs about the course expectations.   
 Metacognition, or the act of thinking about and regulating cognitive processes, refers to 
the ability to monitor one’s current learning, evaluate the learning against a criterion, and make 
and execute plans to maximize one’s learning (Tobias & Everson, 2009). Metacognition is 
commonly viewed as consisting of metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive monitoring, and 
metacognitive control (Dunlosky, & Metcalfe, 2009). The predominant assumption in theories of 
metacognition and theories of self-regulation is that the ways that individuals engage with the 
material, (i.e., metacognitive control strategies) depend on the accuracy with which they are able 
to monitor their current learning, and their knowledge of, and beliefs about, the effectiveness of 
different cognitive strategies (i.e., metacognitive knowledge). In other words, there is a dynamic 
and reciprocal relationship between metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive control (Ariel, 
Dunlosky, & Bailey, 2009; Greene & Azevedo, 2007; Metcalfe & Kornell, 2005; Nelson & 
Narens, 1990; 1994; Son & Metcalfe, 2000; Winne & Hadwin, 1998). 
 To study metacognitive monitoring, learners are often asked to make metacognitive 
judgments about their learning at various points in the learning process (Dunlosky & Thiede, 
2013) using inferential processes that utilize beliefs about the connection between learning and 
theory-based or heuristic-based cues (Benjamin, 2005; Castel, 2008; Koriat, 1997; Ozuru, Kurby, 
& McNamara, 2012). Learners use their goals for the task, beliefs about the task, along with their 
metacognitive judgments to make choices to continue or terminate studying or to change 
studying strategies (Ariel, et al., 2009; Tullis & Benjamin, 2011). The accuracy of the 
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metacognitive judgments is often measured by examining the calibration, or the correspondence 
between the judgment and one’s performance (Rhodes, 2015).  
 Given the need for metacognitive calibration to facilitate the selection of optimal control 
processes, it is important for research to focus on the characteristics and traits associated with 
accurate metacognitive monitoring as well as the effects that common academic interventions 
have on the accuracy of metacognitive judgments. This is especially relevant for introductory 
STEM courses given that, while over one-quarter of students entering a bachelor’s degree 
program enroll in a STEM major at some point in their career, only half of those students leave 
having completed a STEM degree (Chen, 2013). Several factors affect students’ decisions to 
persist within a major, however the grades a student earns in their introductory courses are often 
the strongest predictor of persistence within STEM majors (Cromley, Perez, & Kaplan, 2016; 
King, 2015).  
 A large fraction of course grades in introductory STEM courses come through course 
exams. However traditional one-shot exams, such as those commonly utilized in introductory 
STEM courses, measure students’ metacognitive ability to recognize when they have sufficiently 
prepared for an exam as much as the exams measure the students’ ability or willingness to learn 
(Nelson, 1996). Because of this, success within introductory STEM courses is due, at least in 
part, to the effectiveness with which students can successfully engage in metacognitive 
monitoring and control when preparing for exams. However, the ability to monitor one’s task 
performance accurately appears to largely overlap with the ability to accurately perform that task 
(Ehrlinger, Johnson, Banner, Dunning, & Kruger, 2008; Kelemen, Winningham, & Weaver, 
2007; Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Rebello, 2012; Schneider, 2002). Low-performing students tend 
to be more overconfident, and make less accurate metacognitive judgments, than high-
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performing students (Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003; Griffin, Jee, & Wiley, 2009; 
Schlosser, Dunning, Johnson, & Kruger, 2013). However, there is not a consensus in the 
literature about whether low-performing students are aware of their lack of metacognitive 
calibration (Händel & Dresel, 2018; Händel & Fritzsche, 2016; Miller, & Geraci, 2011a; Shake 
& Shulley 2014). 
 There is also no consensus whether individuals can improve their metacognitive 
calibration over the course of a semester (Foster, Was, Dunlosky, & Isaacson, 2017; Hacker, Bol, 
& Bahbahani, 2008; Hacker, Bol, Horgan, & Rakow, 2000; Miller, & Geraci, 2011b; Nietfeld, 
Cao, & Osborne, 2005; 2006; Schlosser, et al., 2013). In addition, the role that academic goal 
orientations and epistemological beliefs play in making metacognitive judgments about future 
exam performance is not clear. Because a large percentage of students’ overall grades in many 
introductory STEM courses is derived from a small number of exams, it is important to identify 
individuals whose metacognitive judgments do not align with their ability before the first exam. 
By identifying students who are risk of these illusions of understanding, appropriate 
interventions can be implemented for these students so that they do not find themselves in a hole 
from which they cannot recover. Besides identifying students at risk of overconfidence, 
understanding the role that academic goal orientations and epistemological beliefs play in 
making metacognitive judgments is crucial for designing effective interventions aimed at 
preparing students for exams.  
  One reason that low-performing students may be “underprepared and overconfident” is 
that they tend to engage in passive study habits suited for providing familiarity with the material 
(Blasiman, Dunlosky, & Rawson, 2017). To promote active studying habits, such as self-testing 
and problem-solving, low-performing students need support to help them progress when they are 
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unable to make progress. A commonly utilized intervention used to prepare students for exam in 
introductory STEM courses is to engage students in problem-solving alternated with expert 
worked-examples, which appears to be effective for students’ initial learning (Belski & Belski, 
2013; Belski & Belski, 2016; Lusk & Atkinson, 2007; Mestre, Morphew, & Gladding, 2015; 
Nievelstein, van Gog, van Dijck, & Boshuizen, 2013; Rourke & Sweller, 2009; Sweller & 
Cooper, 1985; van Gog, Kester, & Paas, 2011). However, it is not understood how these 
solutions affect students’ metacognitive judgments about their ability to solve similar problems 
on their own. This is critical if these interventions are used to help students review and study for 
exams. In addition, it may be beneficial for interventions to develop students’ metacognitive 
abilities, goal orientations, and epistemological beliefs while also teaching content specific skills.  
Research Agenda 
This dissertation has two overarching goals that are investigated over three papers. The 
first goal for the dissertation is study is to examine the trajectories in the accuracy of students’ 
metacognitive monitoring over the course of a semester and to identify any predictor variables 
related to both the initial metacognitive accuracy and the change in metacognitive accuracy over 
time. The second goal for the dissertation is to explore the effect that viewing animated-narrated 
solution videos has on metacognitive monitoring accuracy for students enrolled in introductory 
physics courses. The first goal is explored in Chapters 2 and 3, while the second goal is 
examined in Chapter 4.  
The first paper, found in Chapter 2, examines the relationship between domain ability and 
metacognitive calibration within the domain. An inverse and asymmetric relationship is often 
found, where lower-performing individuals are less accurate in making metacognitive judgments 
(Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003; Kruger & Dunning, 1999). However, there is not 
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a consensus about the extent to which lower-performing individuals are aware of their 
metacognitive inaccuracies (e.g., Miller & Geraci, 2011a; Schlosser, et al., 2013). To address this 
discrepancy, students in two introductory physics classes made predictions and postdictions of 
their course exam grades. I examine the accuracy with which students made predictions and 
postdictions using two measures of metacognitive calibration. In addition, to examine the 
students’ metacognitive awareness, I examine how students make changes to their predictions 
after taking the exam, and propose a new measure of metacognitive awareness by measuring the 
magnitude, directions, and effectiveness of changes in metacognitive monitoring judgments.  
The second paper, found in Chapter 3, investigates the trajectories in the accuracy of 
students’ metacognitive monitoring over the course of a semester. To examine whether 
individuals are able to improve their calibration over time, and the effect of feedback on changes 
in monitoring accuracy, I examine the exam predictions of students enrolled in an introductory 
physics course using person-centered methodologies. Specifically, I employ growth mixture 
modeling to identify different trajectories of metacognitive calibration. I also investigate the 
relationship between academic ability, metacognitive monitoring feedback, epistemological 
beliefs, and academic goal orientations and the change in metacognitive monitoring accuracy to 
potential constructs related to metacognitive monitoring. 
The third paper, found in Chapter 4, investigates the effect that viewing animated-
narrated solution videos has on the performance and metacognitive calibration of low-
performing students preparing for exams in introductory physics courses. Finally, Chapter 5 
reviews the findings from the dissertation, considers the theoretical and practical implications of 
the studies presented in the dissertation, and proposes future directions for research. Because the 
dissertation is presented as three papers, the motivations, theoretical foundations, and literature 
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reviews for each paper can be at the beginning of each chapter. In addition, due to the 
interconnected nature of the papers, the literature reviews will contain some degree of overlap 








CHAPTER 2: UNSKILLED AND UNAWARE? THE DUNNING-KRUGER 
EFFECT REVISITED  
Metacognition is a multifaceted construct that includes metacognitive knowledge derived 
from prior learning experiences, and metacognitive skills such as monitoring and control 
(Dunlosky, & Metcalfe, 2009; Flavel, 1979). The presence of a dynamic interaction between 
metacognitive monitoring and control processes, such that metacognitive monitoring affects the 
control processes that individuals use while engaging in learning activities is found in both 
theories of metacognition and self-regulated learning (e.g., Greene & Azevedo, 2007; Nelson & 
Narens, 1990; Soderstrom, Yue, & Bjork, 2015; Winne & Hadwin, 1998). When engaged in self-
regulated learning tasks, such as preparing for an exam, students monitor their current level of 
knowledge or understanding. If a discrepancy exists between the learner’s self-assessed current 
state and an internal model representing the desired state, the learner uses their metacognitive 
knowledge about learning to make metacognitive control decisions. These control decisions 
include the decision to continue or terminate studying, to select new exemplar problems to study, 
(Dunlosky & Rawson, 2011; Metcalfe & Finn, 2008; Mihalca, Mengelkamp, & Schnotz, 2017; 
Son & Metcalfe, 2000; Wilkinson, Reader, & Payne, 2012), to revise answers during an exam 
(Couchman, Miller, Zmuda, Feather & Schwartzmeyer, 2016), and make changes to study 
strategies (Benjamin & Bird, 2006; Desender, Boldt, & Yeung, 2018; Morehead, Dunlosky, & 
Foster, 2017; Pyc & Dunlosky, 2010; Son, 2004: Toppino, LaVan, & Iaconelli, 2018). Because 
metacognitive control decisions are dependent on monitoring, the effectiveness of the self-




The cue-utilization hypothesis asserts that individuals make metacognitive monitoring 
judgments using integrated information from theory-based and heuristic-based cues (Ariel & 
Dunlosky, 2011; Koriat, 1997). Theory-based cues relate to the learner’s beliefs about the way in 
which the characteristics of the task or learning conditions are related to difficulty of learning, 
while heuristic-based cues are implicit cues, such as familiarity or fluency, that are used by 
learners to indicate how well the material has been learned. Most theories of metacognition posit 
that individuals make metacognitive judgments using inferential processes that use both theory-
based and heuristic-based cues (Ariel & Dunlosky, 2011; Koriat, 1997). Although the extent that 
learners employ each cue type when making metacognitive judgments depends on the 
motivation, goals, and attributions of the learner (Dinsmore & Parkinson, 2013; Koriat, 
Nussinson, & Ackerman, 2014), students often rely on heuristic-based cues such as familiarity 
and fluency when making metacognitive judgments (Benjamin, 2005; Koriat and Ma’ayan, 
2005; Koriat, Nussinson, & Ackerman, 2014; Ozuru, Kurby, & McNamara, 2012).  
Dunning-Kruger Effect 
Individuals’ metacognitive judgments tend to correlate with their performance in many 
settings (Nelson & Narens, 1994; Ohtai & Hisasaka, 2018). However, studies investigating the 
accuracy of individuals’ metacognitive judgments usually find that lower-performing 
participants are less accurate in their metacognitive judgments than higher-performing 
participants. This common and well-known effect, known as the Dunning-Kruger effect, was 
first noted by Kruger and Dunning (1999) across a variety of domains (humor, logical reasoning, 
and grammar). In these experiments, undergraduate students made predictions, completed 
assessments of logical reasoning, grammar, and humor, then made retrospective metacognitive 
judgments about their performance on the assessment (i.e., postdictions). Across all of the 
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experiments, students in the bottom quartile overestimated their performance on the assessments, 
while students in the top quartile underestimated their performance. Notably these results held 
whether the students made predictions about their relative performance (i.e., percentile rank) or 
their absolute performance (i.e, the number of problems correctly solved). In other words, the 
lowest performing students believed that they were above average and that they performed better 
than they actually did. Conversely, high-performing students tended to underestimate both their 
percentile ranking and their scores on the assessments.   
This pattern where individuals overestimate their own performance on exams, with the 
overestimates being more pronounced for low-performing students, has been replicated in studies 
within classrooms concerning exam performance (Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003; 
Miller & Geraci, 2011a; Rebello, 2012; Serra & DeMarree, 2016), in lab studies (Kelemen, 
Winningham, & Weaver, 2007), and in real world contexts (Ehrlinger, Johnson, Banner, 
Dunning, & Kruger, 2008; Haun, Zeringue, Leech, & Foley, 2000; Miller & Geraci, 2011b). In 
addition, low-performing individuals maintain their unwarranted overconfidence even after 
receiving feedback concerning their performance and relative skill (Foster, Was, Dunlosky, & 
Isaacson, 2017; Miller, & Geraci, 2011b; Nietfeld, Cao, & Osborne, 2005).  
Studies of expertise that have looked at issues related to metacognitive judgments have 
demonstrated results consistent with the Dunning-Kruger effect. These studies have found that 
individuals with expertise tend to be more accurate in making metacognitive judgments than 
either novices or individuals with less expertise. For example, Griffin, Jee, and Wiley (2009) 
found that individuals with more knowledge about the game of baseball made more accurate 
metacomprehension judgments after reading five texts related to baseball than participants with 
less baseball knowledge. Similarly, physics experts are more accurate than physics novices in 
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judging the difficulty of physics problems (Chi, Glaser, & Reese, 1982; Fakcharoenphol, 
Morphew, & Mestre, 2015; Gire & Rebello, 2010). Similar findings have been found for learners 
engaged in problem solving tasks (deBruin, Rikers, & Schmidt, 2007; Loffler, von der Linden, & 
Schneider, 2016). However, it should be noted that a few studies have found that increased 
domain familiarity can lead to greater overconfidence when making metacognitive judgments of 
performance made before being introduced to a task, indicating that expertise may not benefit 
metacognitive accuracy for all types of judgments (Glenberg & Epstein, 1987; Shanks & Serra, 
2014).  
Reasons for the Dunning-Kruger effect 
Low-performing individuals exhibit greater overconfidence and less metacognitive 
accuracy across a variety of contexts. However, the reason for this pattern remains a source of 
debate. One view is that the expertise and skills needed to produce good performance on a task 
are the same type of expertise and skills needed to produce accurate judgments of performance 
(Schlosser, Dunning, Johnson, & Kruger, 2013). This view implies that low-performing 
individuals tend to have poorer metacognitive monitoring skills than higher performing 
individuals. From this perspective, low performing students suffer from the dual curse of being 
both unskilled and unaware of their lack of skill (Kruger & Dunning, 1999).  
One reason for the observed correlation between metacognition and ability could stem 
from the cue-utilization hypothesis’ assertion that the accuracy of metacognitive judgments 
depends on the alignment between the cues used to make the judgments and the factors that 
affect performance on the test (Koriat, 1997). It may be that lower-performing students hold less 
availing theory-based beliefs, which in turn leads to less effective studying and less accurate 
judgments. For example, lower-performing students tend to engage in less self-testing (Hartwig 
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& Dunlosky, 2012) which is likely based on the erroneous theory-based belief that additional 
study sessions will lead to better retention than engaging in testing (Kornell & Son, 2009). In 
addition, lower-performing individuals tend to focus on the surface-features of problems rather 
than their deep structure (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981). Low-performing individuals may 
focus on the familiarity or fluency of surface features making these cues less diagnostic than 
focusing on the familiarity or fluency of the deep structure like high-performing individuals. 
Alternatively, the overconfidence in the metacognitive judgments made by low-
performing individuals may be driven by an overly optimistic desire for a positive outcome 
(Simons, 2013). This view is supported by the observation that students’ predictions are often 
more strongly correlated with their desired grade than with their actual grade (Serra, & 
DeMarree, 2016). From this view, high-performing students are more accurate in metacognitive 
judgments because their performance more closely matches their desired grade than lower-
performing students.  
An alternative view aligns with this interpretation, suggesting that the Dunning-Kruger 
effect may be a statistical artifact rather than a psychological construct. Three main statistical 
explanations have been proposed to explain the Dunning-Kruger effect pattern. The “above-
average effect” account suggests that all individuals tend to view themselves as above average on 
a percentile scale, and that judgments experience regression to the mean given that judgments 
and actual performances are imperfectly correlated (Krueger & Mueller, 2002). This view 
suggests that the Dunning-Kruger effect should be found in studies using relative metacognitive 
judgments (i.e., judgments of percentile rank), and that the effect should disappear when 
controlling for test reliability. However, the Dunning-Kruger effect is robustly found in studies 
using absolute metacognitive judgments (e.g., number of words pairs correctly recalled). In 
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addition, the Dunning-Kruger effect does not disappear after correcting for test reliability 
(Ehrlinger, et al., 2008; Kruger & Dunning, 2002).  
The “noise plus bias” account suggests that individuals at all ability levels are equally 
poor at estimating their relative performance, and that task difficulty determines who is more 
accurate (Burson, Larrick, & Klayman, 2006). An important implication of this perspective is 
that high-performing individuals are only more accurate in their predictions for normatively easy 
tasks, but will be less accurate for normatively difficult tasks. While this holds for relative 
metacognitive judgments, high-performing students are more accurate in their absolute 
metacognitive judgments across tasks of all difficulty levels even in Burson, et al’s data. In 
addition, counterfactual regression analyses suggest that there are different causes for 
miscalibration for low-performing individuals and high-performing individuals when making 
relative metacognitive judgments (Ehrlinger, et al., 2008).  
Finally, the “signal extraction” account suggests that the asymmetry in the miscalibration 
of predictions is due to the distribution of the participants rather than a difference in 
metacognitive ability, such that low-performing students have a more difficult inference problem 
than high-performing students (Krajc & Ortmann, 2008). This view makes two testable 
predictions about the nature of the Dunning-Kruger effect. First, as ability becomes more 
normally distributed in a sample, the asymmetric pattern of errors should disappear. However, 
Schlosser, et al. (2013) investigated this assumption by examining the distributions of scores 
across three studies and found that the asymmetry in prediction accuracy between ability groups 
was evident across several sample distributions. 
The second prediction made from this view is that the asymmetry of metacognitive 
predictions should disappear as individuals gain information about the nature of the assessments 
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and their performance. The ability for low-performing students to become more accurate in 
making metacognitive judgments is an open question. Several studies have indeed found that 
when students make repeated, incentivized predictions the lowest performing students 
demonstrate the most improvement (Hacker, Bol, & Bahbahani, 2008; Nietfeld, Cao, & Osborne, 
2006; Ryvkin, Krajc, Ortmann, 2012). However, other studies have demonstrated greater 
improvement for the highest performing students (Ferraro 2010; Hacker, Bol, Horgan, & Rakow, 
2000; Schlosser, et al., 2013), and others have demonstrated no improvement for any ability 
group (Miller, & Geraci, 2011b; Nietfeld, Cao, & Osborne, 2005; Simons 2013).  
The majority of the evidence presented so far points to the “unskilled and unaware” 
interpretation. However, another view suggests that while lower-performing students are more 
overconfident, they are subjectively aware of their metacognitive inaccuracy. This view is 
primarily informed by research using second-order metacognitive judgments first presented by 
Dunlosky, Serra, Matvey, & Rawson (2005). Studies using second order judgments typically ask 
individuals to make metacognitive judgments either before or after completing a task, and then to 
rate their confidence in the metacognitive judgments. For example, Miller and Geraci (2011a) 
asked students in a psychology course to predict their exam grade, and then to rate their 
confidence in their prediction on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1-5. Students in the bottom-
quartile were most overconfident when making their metacognitive judgments, however they 
reported less confidence in the accuracy of their metacognitive judgments. This pattern of low-
performing students making overconfident judgments, but reporting less confidence in their 
judgments persists across a semester-long course (Miller & Geraci, 2011a; Shake & Shulley 
2014), and is evident on judgments made after taking exams (Händel & Fritzsche, 2016). 
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The pattern of lower second order judgments being made by the lowest-performing 
students is often seen as evidence against the “unskilled and unaware” interpretation. Rather, the 
lowest-performing students appear to demonstrate a subjective awareness of their inaccurate 
metacognitive monitoring. In other words, these students appear to be unskilled, but subjectively 
aware (Miller & Geraci, 2011a). However, Dunlosky, et al. (2005) noted that the relationship 
between metacognitive judgments and second-order judgments follows a U-shaped distribution 
even within subjects. In other words, all individuals tend to be less confident for judgments at the 
middle of a scale, compared to judgments at either extreme. It might be that low-performing 
students make lower second-order judgments because they make predictions that inherently 
evoke lower confidence (i.e., predictions between 40% and 75%) rather than because they 
possess a subjective metacognitive awareness.  
An additional challenge to the subjectively aware interpretation comes from a recent 
study by Händel and Dresel (2018). The authors had students make postdictions for each test 
item rather than a single global judgment. They found that the lowest-performing students 
reported higher second-order judgments for inaccurate postdictions than for accurate 
postdictions, while the highest-performing students reported higher second-order judgments for 
accurate postdictions.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses  
This study investigates the degree to which low-performing students exhibit subjective 
awareness by examining changes in metacognitive judgments made before and after a task to 
determine whether individuals correctly adjust (or maintain) their judgment in response to an 
experience. Individuals with metacognitive awareness should make appropriate adjustments to 
their metacognitive judgments in response to the experience of taking an exam. For example, 
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making more accurate postdiction, or leaving an accurate prediction judgment unchanged. 
Metacognitive awareness is explored in this study by investigating two research questions across 
three experiments. The first research question examines the extent to which the Dunning-Kruger 
effect exists for judgments made before and after completing exams in introductory physics 
courses. The “unskilled and unaware” explanation predicts that high-performing students are 
more accurate in making metacognitive monitoring judgments than low-performing students 
both before and after taking exams regardless of whether bias (i.e., the signed difference between 
a prediction and performance), or absolute bias (i.e., the magnitude of the difference between 
prediction and performance) is used as the measure of calibration.  
The second research question examines how students of different abilities change, or 
maintain, their predicted grade after completing exams. The “unskilled and unaware” 
explanation predicts that high-performing students will be more likely to make correct 
adjustments to their predictions after taking the exam than low-performing students. In addition, 
it is expected that high-performing students will be more effective in making metacognitive 
adjustments that reduce the initial miscalibration of their predictions by at least half as compared 
to low-performing students. 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 attempts to replicate the Dunning-Kruger effect for students taking exams 
in an introductory physics course. Because bias is the signed difference between prediction and 
performance, low-performing students could have higher bias scores even when make 
predictions that are closer to their performance. To investigate the robustness of the Dunning-
Kruger effect, both bias and absolute bias were used to examine metacognitive calibration. In 
addition, differences in monitoring accuracy were analyzed for both predictions and postdictions 
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to determine whether the Dunning-Kruger effect is moderated by the experience of taking an 
exam. Finally, to examine whether low-performing students demonstrate an awareness of their 
lack of metacognitive accuracy, the correctness and magnitudes of the metacognitive adjustments 
made by students after completing their exams were analyzed. 
Participants  
 Participants were 324 Undergraduate students enrolled in an algebra-based introductory 
physics course at a large Midwestern university who completed all course exams and completed 
consent forms at the beginning of the semester agreeing to participate in this study. For ethical 
reasons, students were not required to make predictions or postdicitons, therefore, not all 
students made predictions and postdicitons for every exam. Of the 324 students who completed 
the course the majority made predictions and postdictions on the first three exams. On the first 
exam, 302 made predictions and 284 made postdictions. On the second exam, 298 made 
predictions and 289 made postdictions. On the third exam, and 282 made predictions and 277 
made postdictions1. 
Procedure  
 As part of the course, students completed three computerized midterm exams during the 
semester. Before beginning each exam, students were prompted to make a prediction about their 
expected performance on the exam using the prompt: “Before you begin the exam, please take a 
second to think about what grade you anticipate getting on this exam (0 - 100%). Try to be as 
accurate as you can with your prediction.” After completing the exam students were prompted to 
make a postdiction about their exam performance using the prompt: “Now that you have 
                                                 
1 Of the 327 students in the study, 247 made both predictions and postdictions for all three 
exams. The results of all analyses presented are similar if we include only these 247 students. 
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completed the exam, we would like you to reflect on how you did on the exam and what grade 
you expect to receive (0 - 100%). Try to be as accurate as you can with your prediction.” To 
motivate accurate metacognitive judgments, students who predicted within 3% of their actual 
exam grade were entered into a drawing for one of three $30 prizes on each exam.  
Measures  
 Ability Group. To determine whether high or low performing students show better 
metacognitive calibration or more improvement over time the ability level of each student was 
estimated by calculating their exam average across the course exams. Students were divided into 
quartiles using the average scores from the course exams. The average exam scores for each 
quartile were as follows: First quartile [31% - 53%], second quartile [53% - 66%], third quartile 
[66% - 79%], and fourth quartile [79% - 99%]. The exams varied difficulty for this course as the 
means for the three exams were 72.4%, 57.9%, and 67.0% respectively 
 Bias. Students’ metacognitive bias was calculated by subtracting their exam score from 
their prediction/postdiction so that positive scores represent overconfidence and negative scores 
represent underconfidence.  
 Absolute Bias. Absolute bias was calculated using the absolute value of the bias score. 
This score represents the magnitude of the difference between metacognitive judgments and 
performance on the exam, such that lower scores represent more accurate metacognitive 
judgments. 
 Metacognitive Adjustment. To investigate the extent to which participants made 
adjustments to their metacognitive judgments, the change in absolute bias was calculated for 
participants on each exam by subtracting the absolute bias of the prediction from the absolute 
bias of the postdiction. Negative values indicate that the absolute bias was reduced (i.e, the 
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postdiction was more accurate than the prediction), while positive values indicate that the 
absolute bias increased (i.e, the postdiction was more accurate than the prediction). 
 Metacognitive Adjustment Correctness. To investigate whether participants made 
correct adjustments to their metacognitive judgments from before to after exams, a dichotomous 
adjustment score was calculated for participants on each exam. A correct metacognitive 
adjustment was defined as either making a postdiction that was closer to the actual exam score 
than the prediction, or was within five percentage points of the actual exam score2.  
 Metacognitive Adjustment Efficiency. To investigate the extent to which participants 
made metacognitive adjustments that were efficient in increasing the accuracy of their 
metacognitive calibration, a dichotomous adjustment efficiency score was calculated for 
participants on each exam. A metacognitive adjustment was defined as efficient if either the 
postdiction was within five percentage points of the actual exam score, or if the absolute bias of 
the postdiction was at least half of the absolute bias of the prediction.   
Data Analysis 
 All analyses were conducted using SAS Version 9.4. To examine differences in 
metacognitive monitoring accuracy between ability groups Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) 
were conducted. Following significant ANOVAs, post-hoc pairwise tests were conducted to 
determine the groups that differed. To examine whether ability groups differ in their ability to 
correctly adjust their metacognitive judgments after taking an exam, Chi-Square tests of 
independence were conducted on the monitoring accuracy change and the metacognitive 
adjustment efficiency scores. Finally, to explore differences in the magnitude of the adjustments 
                                                 
2 Five percent was selected as the criterion value because there are typically between 23 and 27 
questions on the exams, making each question worth about five percentage points.   
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made, ANOVAs were conducted on the metacognitive adjustment scores. Post hoc Tukey 
adjusted tests of mean differences were conducted after significant ANOVAs.   
Results and Discussion 
 Metacognitive Judgment Accuracy. To investigate the differences in overconfidence or 
underconfidence based on ability, prediction bias and postdiction bias scores for each ability 
group were compared for all three exams. The distribution of the bias scores were normally 
distributed for each exam, however, Levene’s tests indicated that homogeneity of variance could 
not be assumed for all bias scores (all p < 0.05). Therefore, Welch’s ANOVAs were conducted 
on the bias scores for each exam. Because six tests were conducted, Bonferroni corrections were 
made to the alpha level such that α = 0.008 for the ANOVAs to avoid type I error inflation. The 
means, standard deviations, and ANOVA results are found in Table 2.1. The results indicate that 
ability groups differed in both prediction and postdiction bias for every exam.  
To examine which groups differed in their metacognitive bias, post-hoc Tukey adjusted 
pairwise tests of mean differences were conducted. Low-ability students demonstrated greater 
overconfidence when making metacognitive judgments both before and after taking exams than 
high-ability students (all p < 0.001), and medium-high ability students (all p < 0.001) for every 
exam. In addition, low-ability students demonstrated greater overconfidence when making 
metacognitive judgments both before and after taking exams than medium-low ability students 
on the first and third exams (all p < 0.007). High-ability students were less overconfident when 
making metacognitive judgments before taking exams compared to medium-low ability students 
on every exam (all p < 0.001), and less overconfident than medium-high ability students on the 
first two exams (all p < 0.001). In addition, high-ability students were less overconfident when 
making metacognitive judgments after taking exams compared to medium-low ability students 
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on the second and third exams (all p < 0.03), and less overconfident than medium-high ability 
students on the third exam (p = 0.007). 
To investigate whether ability groups differ in the accuracy of the metacognitive 
judgments, the absolute bias of the predictions and postdictions were compared for all three 
exams. The distribution of the absolute bias scores were not normally distributed, therefore the 
absolute bias scores were transformed using a square root transformation, resulting in relatively 
normal distributions. Levene’s tests indicated that homogeneity of variance could be assumed for 
the absolute bias of the predictions on the first exam (p = 0.15), and the absolute bias of the 
postdictions on all three exams (p > 0.05), but not for the absolute bias of the predictions on the 
second and third exams (all p < 0.05). Therefore, ANOVAs were conducted on the transformed 
absolute bias of the predictions for the first exam and the transformed absolute bias of the 
postdictions for every exam. Welch’s ANOVAs were conducted on the transformed absolute 
bias of the predictions for the second and third exams. Because six ANOVAs were conducted, 
Bonferroni corrections were made to the alpha level such that α = 0.008 for the ANOVAs to 
avoid type I error inflation. The means, standard deviations, and ANOVA results are found in 
Table 2.2. The results indicate that ability groups differed in absolute bias for predictions and 
postdictions on every exam. 
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Table 2.1. Metacognitive Bias by Ability Group. 
 Low  Low-Mid  High-Mid  High  Welch’s ANOVA 
 M (SD) N  M (SD) N  M (SD) N  M (SD) N  F df 𝜂𝑝
2 
Predictions                
    Exam 1 17.3 (15.4) 69  8.0 (11.3) 79  5.6 (10.9) 74  -2.3 (7.4) 80  39.98** 3, 156 .27 
    Exam 2 28.7 (15.3) 69  23.5 (11.7) 74  13.5 (13.9) 75  4.8 (9.6) 80  61.43** 3, 158 .35 
    Exam 3 18.5 (17.2) 65  11.0 (13.6) 75  4.9 (12.4) 72  0.3 (9.4) 70  23.30** 3, 150 .20 
Postdictions                
    Exam 1 11.8 (48.7) 68  1.2 (13.0) 69  1.5 (12.3) 68  -2.0 (8.2) 79  10.82** 3, 144 .13 
    Exam 2 21.6 (18.8) 66  19.5 (12.4) 75  10.3 (13.3) 71  2.9 (11.1) 77  31.99** 3, 153 .23 
    Exam 3 13.2 (17.7) 62  6.5 (13.1) 74  3.2 (11.5) 69  0.6 (8.3) 72  10.37** 3, 144 .11 
Note: * p < .001, ** p < .0001 
 
 
Table 2.2. Absolute bias by Ability Group. 
 Low  Low-Mid  High -Mid  High  ANOVA 
 M (SD) N  M (SD) N  M (SD) N  M (SD) N  F df 𝜂𝑝
2 
Predictions                
     Exam 1 19.6 (12.2) 69  10.6 (8.8) 79  9.8 (7.4) 74  5.9 (4.9) 80  28.95** 3, 298 .23 
     Exam 2 29.0 (14.8) 69  23.5 (11.7) 74  16.0 (10.8) 75  8.6 (6.3) 80  51.43** 3, 159 .31 
     Exam 3 21.8 (12.7) 65  14.9 (9.2) 75  10.8 (7.8) 72  7.5 (5.5) 70  26.99** 3, 152 .23 
Postdictions                
     Exam 1 18.0 (12.7) 68  9.6 (8.8) 69  10.0 (7.2) 68  5.8 (6.0) 79  24.55** 3, 280 .21 
     Exam 2 24.8 (14.3) 66  20.3 (11.0) 75  14.4 (8.6) 71  8.8 (7.3) 77  32.02** 3, 285 .25 
     Exam 3 18.7 (11.7) 62  11.9 (8.6) 74  9.2 (7.5) 69  6.5 (5.2) 72  20.88** 3, 273 .19 
Note: Welch’s ANOVA conducted on Prediction Calibration for exams 2 and 3. * p < 0.001, ** p < 0.0001 
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To examine which groups differed on absolute bias, post-hoc Tukey adjusted pairwise 
tests of mean differences were conducted. The predictions and postdictions made by low-ability 
students were less accurate than those made by than high-ability students (all p < 0.001), and 
medium-high ability students (all p < 0.001) on every exam, and less accurate than medium-low 
ability students (all p < 0.001) on the first and third exams. For high-ability students, both the 
predictions and postdictions made were more accurate than those made by medium-low ability 
students (all p < 0.02) for every exam, and more accurate than those made by medium-high 
ability students on the first and second exams (all p < 0.01). 
 Changes in Metacognitive Judgments. To examine whether ability groups differ in 
their ability to correctly adjust their metacognitive judgments after taking an exam, Chi-Square 
tests of independence were conducted on the monitoring accuracy change scores. The percentage 
of students who made correct monitoring accuracy changes within each ability group can be 
found in Table 2.3. The results indicate that there was no difference between the ability groups in 
making monitoring accuracy changes on the any of the three exams (all p > 0.08).  
 To examine differences in the effectiveness of the students’ metacognitive adjustments, 
differences in the metacognitive adjustment were examined. The distribution of the bias scores 
were relatively normally distributed for each exam, however Levene’s tests indicated that 
homogeneity of variance could not be assumed for all exams (all p < 0.06). Therefore, Welch’s 
ANOVAs were conducted on the metacognitive adjustment scores. Because three ANOVAs 
were conducted, Bonferroni corrections were made to the alpha level such that α = 0.016 for the 
ANOVAs to avoid type I error inflation. The means, standard deviations, and ANOVA results 
are found in Table 2.4. The results indicate that ability groups differed in their metacognitive 
adjustments on the second exam, but not for the first and third exams. Post-hoc Tukey adjusted 
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pairwise tests of mean differences indicated that low-ability students made larger metacognitive 
adjustments on the second exam than high-ability students (all p = 0.005). In addition, medium-
low-ability students made larger metacognitive adjustments the second exam than high-ability 
students (p = 0.01).  








High χ2 (3) p 
Monitoring Adjustment Correctness       
     Exam 1 61.2 58.0 52.2 72.2 6.57 0.09 
     Exam 2 60.6 61.1 62.0 53.3 1.52 0.68 
     Exam 3 52.5 67.1 65.2 60.0 3.45 0.33 
Metacognitive Adjustment Efficiency       
     Exam 1 23.9 40.6 37.3 64.6 26.07 < 0.001 
     Exam 2 12.1 19.4 22.5 37.7 14.07 0.003 
     Exam 3 25.4 41.1 40.6 50.0 8.19 0.04 
       
 To examine the effectiveness of the metacognitive adjustments made by the different 
ability groups, Chi-Square tests of independence were conducted on the metacognitive 
adjustment efficiency scores. The percentage of students who made efficient metacognitive 
adjustments within each ability group can be found in Table 2.3. The results indicate that there 
was a difference in metacognitive adjustment efficiency between ability groups on all three 
exams (all p < 0.04). To identify whether high-ability and low-ability groups differed in 
metacognitive adjustment efficiency, three pair-wise Chi-Square tests of independence were 
conducted to compare the high-ability group to the low ability group for each exam. Because 
three Chi-Square tests were conducted, a Bonferroni correction was made to the critical alpha 
level such that α = 0.016 to avoid type I error inflation. The results indicate that students in the 
high-ability group were more likely to adjust their metacognitive judgments so that they were 
either within five percentage points of their actual performance, or reduce their miscalibration by 
at least 50% compared to students in the low-ability group (all p < 0.005) on every exam.  
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  To examine why the high-ability group differed in making correct and efficient 
adjustments to their metacognitive judgments, the percentage of individuals who did not make 
changes to their metacognitive judgments was compared. Three Chi-square tests of independence 
indicated that high-ability students were not less likely than the other groups to make changes in 














Table 2.4. Metacognitive Adjustment Magnitude by Ability Group. 
 Low  Low-Mid  High-Mid  High  Welch’s ANOVA 
 M (SD) N  M (SD) N  M (SD) N  M (SD) N  F df 𝜂𝑝
2 
    Exam 1 -1.6 (11.9) 67  -0.6 (9.1) 69  -0.3 (7.0) 67  -0.2 (5.3) 79  0.45* 3, 144 .01 
    Exam 2 -4.0 (9.6) 66  -3.6 (8.2) 72  -1.6 (6.8) 71  -0.4 (6.2) 77  5.39* 3, 152 .05 
    Exam 3 -3.4 (9.8) 59  -3.2 (7.7) 73  -1.8 (6.9) 69  -0.9 (5.4) 70  2.74* 3, 142 .02 








The results from Experiment 1 may stem from the population. The majority of students 
enrolled in the introductory algebra-based course are life science or pre-med majors. These 
students tend to have less experience and interest in physics than students enrolled in the 
calculus-based introductory course, which is designed for physics and engineering majors. It may 
mean that differences in interest and motivation between the ability groups contribute to the 
accuracy of student’s metacognitive monitoring and how they make metacognitive adjustments. 
Experiment 2 examines how students that tend to have greater interest and experience with 
physics make and adjust metacognitive predictions. 
Participants  
 Participants were 989 undergraduate students enrolled in a calculus-based introductory 
physics course at a large Midwestern university who completed consent forms at the beginning 
of the semester agreeing to participate in this study. Students in this course tend to be physical 
science or engineering majors. For ethical reasons, students were not required to make 
predictions or postdicitons, therefore, not all students made predictions and postdicitons for 
every exam. Of the 989 students, who completed all of the course exams the majority made 
predictions and postdictions for all three exams. On the first exam, 967 made predictions and 777 
made postdictions. On the second exam, 946 made predictions and 903 made postdictions. On 
the third exam, and 950 made predictions and 836 made postdictions3.   
 
 
                                                 
3 Of the 989 students in the study, 614 made both predictions and postdictions for all three 




 The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, except that students completed the three 
exams on paper during the semester. 
Measures and Data Analysis  
 All measures and data analysis were the same as in Experiment 1. Students were divided 
into quartiles using the average of the course exams. The average exam scores for each quartile 
were as follows: First quartile [37% - 70%], second quartile [70% - 79%], third quartile [79% - 
87%], and fourth quartile [87% - 100%]. The exams for this course had relatively high averages 
and much more consistent in difficulty. The means for the three exams were 78.6%, 78.2%, and 
75.9% respectively. 
Results and Discussion 
 Metacognitive Judgment Accuracy. To investigate the differences in the accuracy of 
metacognitive judgments by ability, the prediction bias and postdiction bias scores of the four 
ability groups were compared for all three exams. The distribution of the bias scores were 
normally distributed for each exam. Levene’s tests indicated that homogeneity of variance could 
not be assumed for all bias scores (all p > 0.005). Therefore, Welch’s ANOVAs were conducted 
on the bias scores for each exam. Because six ANOVAs were conducted, Bonferroni corrections 
were made to the alpha level such that α = 0.008 for the ANOVAs to avoid type I error inflation. 
The means, standard deviations, and ANOVA results are found in Table 2.5. The results indicate 
that ability groups differed in both prediction and postdiction bias for every exam.  
To determine which groups differed on metacognitive bias, post-hoc Tukey adjusted 
pairwise tests of mean differences indicated that low-ability students demonstrated greater 
overconfidence when making metacognitive judgments both before and after taking exams than 
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high-ability students (all p < 0.001), medium-high ability students (all p < 0.001), and medium-
low ability students (all p < 0.001) for every exam. High-ability students were less overconfident 
when making metacognitive judgments before taking exams compared to medium-low ability 
students (all p < 0.001), and medium-high ability students (all p < 0.005) for every exam. In 
addition, high-ability students were less overconfident when making metacognitive judgments 
after taking exams compared to medium-low ability students on every exam (all p < 0.005). 
To investigate whether ability groups differ in the accuracy of the metacognitive 
judgments, prediction and postdiction absolute bias scores for each ability group were compared 
for all three exams. The distribution of the absolute bias scores were not normally distributed, 
therefore, they were transformed using a square root transformation, resulting in relatively 
normal distributions. Levene’s tests indicated that homogeneity of variance could not be 
assumed for the absolute bias of predictions on every exam (all p < 0.001), and the absolute bias 
of postdictions on the first and final exams (p < 0.005). Therefore, six Welch’s ANOVAs were 
conducted on the transformed absolute bias scores with Bonferroni corrections made to the alpha 
level such that α = 0.006 for the ANOVAs. The means, standard deviations, and Welch’s 
ANOVA results are found in Table 2.6. The results indicate that ability groups differed in 
absolute bias for both predictions and postdictions on every exam. 
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Table 2.5. Metacognitive Bias by Ability Group. 
 Low  Low-Mid  High-Mid  High  Welch’s ANOVA 
 M (SD) N  M (SD) N  M (SD) N  M (SD) N  F df 𝜂𝑝
2 
Predictions                
    Exam 1 17.0 (14.1) 245  8.8 (11.6) 245  4.4 (9.6) 242  1.0 (8.3) 235  84.95** 3, 529 .23 
    Exam 2 14.2 (13.8) 234  5.1 (11.2) 239  1.1 (9.1) 236  -2.4 (8.7) 237  86.57** 3, 517 .24 
    Exam 3 14.3 (13.2) 237  7.7 (10.2) 239  3.9 (8.6) 236  -0.2 (7.8) 238  79.93** 3, 518 .22 
Postdictions                
    Exam 1 11.2 (13.8) 191  5.6 (11.8) 183  2.5 (10.4) 201  0.0 (8.9) 201  32.81** 3, 420 .12 
    Exam 2 10.2 (13.5) 217  2.5 (10.7) 225  0.8 (9.1) 232  -1.8 (7.2) 232  46.69** 3, 485 .16 
    Exam 3 7.8 (14.2) 206  3.0 (10.6) 207  0.7 (9.4) 210  -0.5 (8.5) 210  19.47** 3, 455 .08 
Note: * p < .001, ** p < .0001 
 
 
Table 2.6. Absolute bias by Ability Group. 
 Low  Low-Mid  High -Mid  High  Welch’s ANOVA 
 M (SD) N  M (SD) N  M (SD) N  M (SD) N  F df 𝜂𝑝
2 
Predictions                
     Exam 1 19.0 (11.3) 245  11.5 (9.0) 245  8.3 (6.5) 242  6.0 (5.8) 235  102.31** 3, 534 .25 
     Exam 2 16.5 (11.1) 234  9.7 (7.6) 239  7.2 (5.6) 236  6.2 (6.6) 237  67.25** 3, 521 .20 
     Exam 3 16.4 (10.4) 237  10.5 (7.3) 239  7.6 (5.5) 236  6.0 (5.0) 238  75.62** 3, 523 .21 
Postdictions                
     Exam 1 14.6 (10.0) 191  10.3 (8.0) 183  8.4 (6.6) 201  6.6 (5.9) 201  33.98** 3, 424 .12 
     Exam 2 13.5 (10.3) 217  8.7 (6.7) 225  7.3 (5.4) 232  5.6 (4.8) 232  36.63** 3, 494 .12 
     Exam 3 12.9 (9.7) 206  8.6 (6.8) 207  7.3 (6.0) 210  6.5 (5.5) 210  27.35** 3, 460 .10 
Note: * p < .001, ** p < .0001 
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To examine which groups differed on absolute bias, post-hoc Tukey adjusted pairwise 
tests of mean differences indicated that both the predictions and postdictions made by low-ability 
students were less accurate on every exam than those made by than high-ability students (all p < 
0.001), medium-high ability students (all p < 0.001), and medium-low ability students (all p < 
0.001) for every exam. For high-ability students, both the predictions and postdictions made 
were more accurate than those made by medium-low ability students (all p < 0.001) for every 
exam. In addition, predictions made by high-ability students were more accurate than those made 
by medium-high ability students on the first and third exams (all p < 0.01), while the postdictions 
were more accurate on the first and second exams (all p < 0.03). 
 Changes in Metacognitive Judgments. To examine whether ability groups differ in 
their ability to correctly adjust their metacognitive judgments after taking an exam, Chi-Square 
tests of independence were conducted on the monitoring accuracy change scores. The percentage 
of students who made correct monitoring accuracy changes within each ability group can be 
found in Table 2.7. The results indicate that there was a difference between the ability groups in 
making monitoring accuracy changes on the first exam (p = 0.001), but not on the remaining 
three exams (all p > 0.10). To identify which ability groups differed in making correct 
monitoring accuracy changes on the first exam, pair-wise tests were conducted using Bonferroni 
corrections level such that α = 0.008 for the pair-wise Chi-Square tests of independence. The 
results indicate that students in the low-ability group made more correct monitoring accuracy 
changes than students in the other three groups (all p < 0.001).  
 To examine differences in the effectiveness of the students’ metacognitive adjustments, 
differences in the metacognitive adjustment were examined. The distributions for the 
metacognitive adjustments were normally distributed for each exam. Levene’s tests indicated 
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that homogeneity of variance could not be assumed for all exams (all p < .001). Therefore, 
Welch’s ANOVAs were conducted on the metacognitive adjustment scores using Bonferroni 
corrections such that α = 0.016 for the ANOVAs. The means, standard deviations, and ANOVA 
results are found in Table 2.8. The results indicate that ability groups differed in their 
metacognitive adjustments for the all three exams. Post-hoc Tukey adjusted pairwise tests of 
mean differences indicated that low-ability students made larger metacognitive adjustments on 
every exam than high-ability students (all p < 0.001), and medium-high ability students (all p < 
0.001). In addition, low-ability students made larger metacognitive adjustments on every exam 
than medium-low ability students on the first two exams (all p < 0.001). No other groups differed 
in their metacognitive adjustments (all p > 0.08).  
Table 2.7. Percentage of each ability group with correct monitoring adjustments and efficient 







High χ2 (3) p 
Monitoring Accuracy Change       
     Exam 1 69.1 52.5 52.2 56.0 14.89 0.001 
     Exam 2 62.0 53.2 59.0 64.2 6.31 0.10 
     Exam 3 62.0 65.0 60.6 55.7 3.92 0.27 
Metacognitive Adjustment Efficiency       
     Exam 1 28.8 32.2 38.3 47.5 16.92 < 0.001 
     Exam 2 33.3 34.7 44.9 57.1 33.03 < 0.001 
     Exam 3 32.5 47.3 45.3 48.1 13.11 0.004 
       
 To examine the effectiveness of the metacognitive adjustments made by the different 
ability groups, Chi-Square tests of independence were conducted on the metacognitive 
adjustment efficiency scores. The percentage of students who made efficient metacognitive 
adjustments within each ability group can be found in Table 2.7. The results indicate that there 
was a difference in metacognitive adjustment efficiency between ability groups on all three 
exams (p < 0.005). To identify whether high-ability and low-ability groups differed in 
metacognitive adjustment efficiency, three pair-wise Chi-Square tests of independence were 
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conducted with a Bonferroni correction such that α = 0.016. The results indicate that students in 
the high-ability group were more likely to adjust their metacognitive judgments so that they were 
either within five percentage points of their actual performance, or reduced their miscalibration 
by at least 50% compared to students in the low-ability group (all p < 0.001) on every exam.  
  To examine why the high-ability group differed in making correct and efficient 
adjustments to their metacognitive judgments, the percentage of individuals who did not makes 
changes to their metacognitive judgments was compared. Three Chi-square tests of independence 
indicated that high-ability students were more likely than the other groups to make identical 














Table 2.8. Metacognitive Adjustment Magnitude by Ability Group. 
 Low  Low-Mid  High-Mid  High  Welch’s ANOVA 
 M (SD) N  M (SD) N  M (SD) N  M (SD) N  F df 𝜂𝑝
2 
    Exam 1 -4.3 (8.4) 191  -0.5 (6.1) 183  -0.3 (4.8) 201  -0.6 (3.8) 200  18.97** 3, 409 .10 
    Exam 2 -2.8 (7.4) 213  -0.7 (5.8) 222  -0.2 (4.5) 227  -0.1 (4.2) 226  7.89** 3, 479 .04 
    Exam 3 -3.1 (8.5) 200  -2.0 (7.7) 203  -0.4 (5.2) 203  -0.4 (4.4) 210  12.13*** 3, 435 .04 







Across both experiments, low-performing students were more overconfident across all 
exams when predicting their exam grades than high-performing students. While predictions 
made before taking the exam might reflect perceptions of the material that might show up on an 
exam, this overconfidence remained for judgments made after completing the exam. The 
Dunning-Kruger pattern was found for both bias scores and absolute bias scores with similar 
effect sizes for both measures. This suggests that this difference is related to differences in 
metacognition rather than simply the fact that high-performing students have less room to 
overpredict. 
The results suggest that the observed differences in metacognitive accuracy are likely to 
be psychological rather than statistical. In contrast to the “noise plus bias” account, which 
suggests that the effect of ability group on absolute bias should decrease as the task difficulty 
increases (Burson, et al., 2006), the effect sizes in Experiment 1 were larger for the most difficult 
exam compared to the easiest exam. However, the effect of exam difficulty on the magnitude of 
the effect size is difficult to examine with this data set since students are likely to use 
performance on prior exams when making predictions about future exam performance (Foster, et 
al., 2018). Also, given the limited number of exams, there was no discernable pattern across both 
experiments in the relationship between effect size and exam difficulty. Future research should 
investigate this relationship in a more controlled study. 
In addition, the “signal extraction” account predicts that the asymmetry of metacognitive 
predictions should disappear as individuals gain information about the nature of the assessments 
and their performance. However, there is not a consistent decrease in the bias or absolute bias of 
the low-performing students across the semester, nor in the effect sizes for each exam. This 




exams may not be enough to see an effect, however other studies have also failed to detect 
improvement in metacognitive accuracy even with as many as 13 exams (e.g., Foster, et al., 
2018; Miller, & Geraci, 2011b; Nietfeld, et al., 2005; Simons 2013).  
While the evidence is clear that low-performing students are less accurate at 
metacognitive monitoring compared to high-performing students, the evidence for the subjective 
awareness of low-performing students is less clear. In general, between half and three-fourths of 
all students were able to make correct metacognitive adjustments. Contrary to expectations, low-
performing students made correct metacognitive adjustments as frequently as high-performing 
students across all exams (and more frequently on one exam for the algebra-based course). This 
suggests that low-performing students were at least aware of the inaccuracy, and overconfidence, 
of their initial predictions after having the experience of taking the exams. Higher-performing 
students, conversely, were aware of their initial accuracy or underconfidence of their predictions. 
The awareness low-performing students displayed about their initial predictions did not 
help low-performing students to efficiently reduce their miscalibration. Across both experiments 
low-performing students were less efficient in making metacognitive adjustments than high-
performing students on every exam. This inefficiency stems from both the initial overconfidence, 
and from low-performing students not making sufficient adjustments to their predictions after 
taking the exams. However, the degree to which low-performing students demonstrated a 
subjective metacognitive awareness differed between the two courses. Low-performing students 
in the algebra-based physics course did not consistently make larger metacognitive adjustments 
than high-performing students, and were equally likely to leave their predictions unchanged, 
even though their predictions were less accurate. These results suggest that low-performing 
students had difficulties making adjustments even though they had a stronger signal that their 




physics course made larger metacognitive adjustments, and were less likely to leave their 
predictions unchanged, on every exam. Because students in the calculus-based course tend to 
have greater interest and experience with physics material, these results suggest that the 
metacognitive awareness needed to make sufficient changes in one’s initial prediction are also 
likely a function of ability and their investment in the course. 
The under correction of the overconfidence exhibited by the predictions made by low-
performing students may come from a desire to maintain a positive self-image or a desire for 
positive outcomes (Serra & DeMarree, 2016; Simons, 2013). Another source of interference for 
making efficient metacognitive adjustments is the nature of the test itself. All of the exams were 
multiple-choice exams that were constructed so that the distractors include the most common 
incorrect answers. Individuals typically make metacognitive judgments using information-based 
cues such as prior knowledge and test characteristics, and heuristic-based cues such and fluency 
and familiarity (Dinsmore & Parkinson, 2013; Koriat, 1997). Students who have a strong 
misconception are likely to find their answer among the distractors on the test, which may 
increase their confidence in the incorrect answer. Students may make metacognitive judgments 
after the exam by thinking about the number of questions where their answer did not appear. 
This method for making postdicitions could inflate students’ overconfidence, making them less 
likely to make efficient metacognitive adjustments. Future research should attempt to replicate 





CHAPTER 3: CHANGES IN METACOGNITIVE MONITORING ACCURACY 
IN INTRODUCTORY PHYSICS 
 Learning is a complex interrelationship among memory, attention, motivation, goals, 
affect, metacognition, and epistemology, among other constructs. This is especially true within 
authentic contexts such as introductory science, technology, engineering, and mathematics 
(STEM) courses where learners often engage in learning that is largely self-regulated. Course 
instructors create assignments, policies and procedures in an attempt to incentivize availing 
learning behaviors, however the ways in which learners interact with the material and respond to 
course procedures is under the individual’s control, especially for homework and studying for 
exams, which typically occurs outside of the classroom. Success within introductory STEM 
courses is likely due to the effectiveness with which a student engages in self-regulated learning. 
Learning is considered self-regulated when learners have some degree of control over the 
learning process and act as active participants in the learning process (Tuysuzoglu & Greene, 
2015).  
 Self-regulated learning is strategically directed by learners and involves motivation, goal 
setting, affect, and attributions. Because learners are proactive in directing their learning, self-
regulated learning is guided by metacognitive monitoring and control processes (Winne & 
Hadwin, 1998; Zimmerman, 2008). A useful model for investigating the interaction between 
metacognition, academic success, and other individual factors is the four-phase model of self-
regulated learning originally proposed by Winne and Hadwin (1998, 2008). In the first phase the 
learner analyzes and forms a perception of a task. In the second phase the learner uses their task 
definition to generate goals specific to the task. In the third phase, the learner enacts a plan to 




learner will use in their attempt to solve the task. In the fourth phase the learner may adapt their 
strategies in response to feedback. 
 The effectiveness with which learners progress through the phases is mediated by the 
cognitive conditions elicited by the learning context. The cognitive conditions highlighted within 
the model includes many constructs including epistemological beliefs, domain knowledge, 
motivational orientations, and metacognitive knowledge. These constructs are representations 
created by previously experienced similar contexts that are stored in memory, although these 
representations are often unconsciously accessed. The cognitive conditions generated by 
individuals for a particular context influence both the default perceptions of the task and the 
standards for which the metacognitive processes will be evaluated against. In other words, the 
effectiveness of learning within this model is determined, in part, by learners’ academic goals for 
the course, their ability to generate task perceptions that are in alignment with the course 
expectations, and their ability to engage in accurate metacognitive monitoring and control.   
Metacognition 
 At a simple level, metacognition is commonly described as thinking and reflecting about 
the thinking process, however all models view metacognition as a multifaceted construct. One 
early definition of metacognition, proposed by Flavel (1979), viewed metacognition as 
consisting of metacognitive knowledge (knowledge and informal theories about human cognition 
in general), metacognitive experiences (individualized experiences one has during their own 
cognition), goals (the objectives of a cognitive activity), and actions (the specific behaviors used 
to achieve the goals). Most current views of metacognition break metacognition into 
metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive skills (Dunlosky, & Metcalfe, 2009; Flavel, 1979; 




 Metacognitive knowledge refers to the declarative knowledge of different cognitive 
strategies, the procedural knowledge of how to implement each cognitive strategy, and the 
beliefs and heuristics concerning the contextual effectiveness of each strategy, all of which is 
derived from prior learning experiences (Pintrich, 2002). Metacognitive skills refer to the ways 
in which learners engage in self-regulated learning processes and include monitoring and control 
processes (Dunlosky & Bjork, 2008). Learners engage in metacognitive monitoring when they 
evaluate their current state of learning against a criterion, and engage in metacognitive control 
when they select study strategies or items for study, or decide when to stop studying. 
 The predominant framework in which metacognition research occurs assumes a dynamic 
and reciprocal relationship occurs between metacognitive monitoring and control processes 
(Nelson and Narens, 1990; 1994). Within this framework, learners need to be able to accurately 
monitor their learning, possess effective heuristics for determining when learning has occurred, 
and utilize effective control strategies for altering their current cognitive processes for learning to 
be effective. Models of self-regulated learning agree with the assertion that metacognitive 
control processes are driven by the accuracy of the learners’ metacognitive monitoring (Ariel, 
Dunlosky, & Bailey, 2009; Greene & Azevedo, 2007; Soderstrom, Yue, & Bjork, 2015; Winne 
& Hadwin, 1998). The relationship between metacognitive monitoring and control is mediated 
by task conditions, learner goals, and metacognitive knowledge (Koriat, Ma’ayan, & Nussinson, 
2006; Koriat, Nussinson, & Ackerman, 2014). For example, learners tend to allocate time to 
material that they judge to be more difficult when they are not time pressured (Finn & Metcalfe, 
2008; Kelley & Jacoby, 1996), but items that are closest to their current ability level when they 
are time pressured (Metcalfe & Kornell, 2005). Learners are also strategic in adapting the time 




perceived item value (Ackerman, 2014; Castel, Benjamin, Craik, & Watkins, 2002; Koriat, 
2007). 
Within self-regulated learning tasks, it is important that learners have an accurate model 
of their current understanding and how it relates to their goals for the specific learning task. 
Research on monitoring processes often focus on the accuracy between monitoring and 
performance. To study the accuracy of individuals’ metacognitive monitoring, learners are asked 
to make judgments about the state of their learning at various times in the learning process 
(Dunlosky & Thiede, 2013). In addition, metacognitive judgments can be made on either an item 
by item-level basis (judgments for each problem), or by having learners provide a single global 
judgement for the entire task (Dunlosky & Thiede, 2013). Metacognitive judgments are typically 
more accurate for judgments made after an exam (postdictions) than those made before an exam 
(predictions), and are usually more accurate for item-level judgments rather than global 
judgments (Dunlosky & Lipko, 2007). However, students preparing for exams in introductory 
STEM courses are unlikely to know the individual questions in advance. As such, item-level 
judgments do not reflect the metacognitive judgments that students are likely to make when 
preparing for course exams. In addition, predictions are likely to reflect the metacognitive 
monitoring that influenced their studying decisions. In this study global predictions were used to 
measure metacognitive monitoring accuracy, because these judgments are more likely to reflect 
the metacognitive monitoring that learners utilize when preparing for exams. 
Metacognitive Monitoring and Ability 
 The accuracy of individual’s metacognitive judgments is often found to be related to 
one’s domain knowledge (Fakcharoenphol, Morphew, & Mestre, 2015; Glaser & Chi, 1988; 
Schneider, 2002). For example, Fakcharoenphol, Morphew, & Mestre (2015) had novices 




difficulty for pair of physics problems, and then predict which problem in a pair was easier for 
undergraduate students to solve. They found that experts were more accurate in predicting the 
difficulty of physics problems even though the novices were current student in the course from 
which the problems were selected.  
 A large body of research has investigated the accuracy of learners’ ability to make 
metacognitive judgments of their learning and performance. These studies have generally found 
that students overestimate their own performance on exams, with the overestimates being more 
pronounced for low-performing students (Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Rebello, 2012; Serra & 
DeMarree, 2016). The asymmetry in the accuracy of learners’ metacognitive judgments is 
thought to occur because the expertise and skills needed to make accurate metacognitive 
judgments of performance are the same type of expertise and skills needed to produce good 
performance on a task (Schlosser, Dunning, Johnson, & Kruger, 2013). From this perspective, 
low performing students suffer from a double curse of being both unskilled and unaware of their 
lack of skill (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). However, the less accurate metacognitive monitoring 
judgments made by low-performing individuals are also likely driven by the desire for positive 
outcomes and misconceptions about the normative difficulty of the tasks as well as 
misconceptions about their own performance (Ehrlinger, Johnson, Banner, Dunning, & Kruger, 
2008; Serra, & DeMarree, 2016; Simons, 2013).  
Changes in Metacognitive Monitoring Accuracy 
 Another issue concerning metacognitive monitoring accuracy is the ability for students to 
improve their metacognitive calibration over time. Laboratory studies have generally 
demonstrated improvements in calibration over time (e.g, Ariel & Dunlosky, 2011; Tauber & 
Dunlosky, 2015; Tauber & Rhodes, 2012). However, the results of classroom studies have been 




judgments over the course of a semester even with interventions designed to focus student 
attention on the accuracy of their predictions and incentives for accurate predictions (e.g., Foster, 
Was, Dunlosky, & Isaacson, 2017; Miller, & Geraci, 2011b; Nietfeld, Cao, & Osborne, 2005). 
Conversely, other studies have shown improvements in calibration over the course of the 
semester (e.g., Hacker, Bol, & Bahbahani, 2008; Hacker, Bol, Horgan, & Rakow, 2000; Nietfeld, 
Cao, & Osborne, 2006) however these are often only for the lower performing students who are 
less well calibrated at the beginning of the course, though notably Hacker, et al. (2000) found 
improvements for high, but not low performing students. Many of the studies analyzed judgment 
accuracy using group centered analyses (e.g., repeated measures ANOVA or MANOVA) that do 
not take individual differences into account. A notable exception is found in Foster, et al. (2017), 
who used multilevel modeling to examine changes in bias (i.e., metacognitive monitoring 
accuracy) over the course of thirteen exams. The authors found that on average students are 
overconfident before taking exams and the magnitude of their overconfidence increased over 
time. However, they also noted that there was significant variation in students bias before taking 
the first exam, and marginally significant variation in the change in bias over the course of the 
semester. In addition, there was significant covariance between the initial bias and the change 
over time. This suggests that the increase in bias over the course of the semester may be 
restricted to those who have lower initial bias.  
Academic Goal Orientation, Epistemological Beliefs, and Metacognition 
 From a self-regulated learning framework, accurate metacognitive monitoring implies 
two acts. First, the learner must set criteria for what it means to know for the upcoming test. 
Second, learners must monitor their learning against the standards they have established. This 
implies that students’ beliefs about the nature of knowledge and learning are likely to influence 




research suggests that overestimates of performance are likely due to individuals overestimating 
their own ability as well as underestimating the difficulty of the problems on the exam (Metcalfe 
& Finn, 2008). In addition, an individual whose goal is to earn a certain grade in the course may 
be more motivated to make an accurate prediction. Conversely a student who is simply focused 
on not failing may be more likely to inflate their judgement to maintain a positive self-image. 
This suggests that a student’s academic goal orientation may also influence the accuracy of their 
metacognitive judgments. While no study to date has investigated the link between 
epistemological beliefs, academic goal orientation, and the accuracy of metacognitive judgments, 
a few studies have investigated the relationship between students’ epistemological beliefs, 
academic goal orientations, and metacognition in general. 
Epistemological Beliefs. The relationship between metacognition and epistemological 
beliefs has been studied by a number of researchers (e.g., Bromme, Pieschl, & Stahl, 2010; 
Hofer, 2004; Kitchner, 1983; Muis, & Franco, 2010). Kitchner (1983) viewed the relationship 
between cognition, metacognition, and epistemology as a three-level system where at the 
epistemological level individuals think on a “meta-meta level” (Barzilai & Zohar, 2014, p. 17), 
reflecting on the limits of their knowing and the nature of knowledge in general. More recently 
epistemology has been conceived as an integral component of metacognition. Hofer (2004) 
utilized the classic distinction between metacognitive knowledge and skills or processes and 
conceptualized epistemological beliefs as components of metacognition. She locates 
epistemological beliefs dealing with the nature of knowledge (the certainty of knowledge and 
simplicity of knowledge) within metacognitive knowledge. Beliefs about the nature of knowing 
(the source of knowledge and the justification for knowing) are located with metacognitive 
processes or skills. From this perspective an individual’s epistemological beliefs will affect 




knowing. An individual who believes that knowledge is transmitted from authorities (a less 
availing belief) is likely to engage in different learning strategies than an individual who believes 
that knowledge is actively constructed (a more availing belief). 
 Within self-regulated learning contexts, the relationship between epistemological beliefs, 
metacognition, and learning is a primary concern. Several models have been proposed which 
view learning as occurring in a cyclical process. The key assumption of these models is that an 
individual’s epistemological beliefs are implicitly activated during the initial phases of a task 
(e.g., studying for an exam). Once activated, these beliefs (along with the nature of the task) 
determine the standards for learning. These standards in turn impact the amount of information 
processed by learners (Pieschl, Stahl, & Bromme, 2008), the metacognitive knowledge which is 
activated, and the metacognitive processes that one employs to complete a learning task 
(Bromme, Pieschl, & Stahl, 2010; Mason, Boldrin, & Ariasi, 2010; Muis & Franco, 2010;).  
The ability to accurately monitor depends on the individual having substantial knowledge 
both within and about the domain in which the task is situated (Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters, & 
Afflerbach, 2006). This includes knowledge about what it means to know within a particular 
domain. In other words, when monitoring cognition individuals must make two simultaneous and 
related judgements. Learners must first decide what it means to know within a subject (e.g., is 
knowledge in the domain complex and interrelated or is it simple and segmented). Then learners 
must decide how their current level of knowledge aligns with the expectations of the domain. 
Similarly, when selecting control strategies learners must draw upon their domain specific 
epistemology in order to determine which strategies best align with the subject and task 
demands. 
 In ecologically situated learning environments the level of alignment between the 




both performance and metacognitive strategy use (Muis, 2008). For example, in a study 
involving vocational college students enrolled in math courses, Schommer-Aikins, Unruh, and 
Morphew (2015) found that the degree of alignment between the epistemological beliefs of 
students and their instructors predicted both course and exam grades even after controlling for 
the beliefs of the students. Similarly, Muis and Franco (2010) assessed the epistemological 
beliefs and metacognitive strategy use of educational psychology students and then engaged 
them in problem solving tasks. They found that students having different epistemic profiles also 
differed in the metacognitive strategy use. In addition, there were differences between the groups 
during problem solving on both regulation of cognition and achievement. 
 Using the framework of epistemic metacognition, we can imagine that two students with 
the same metacognitive level and with the same ability can make drastically different judgments 
of their learning. These different judgments can lead to different strategy use even if they are 
equally capable of employing the same metacognitive strategies. When individuals make 
metacognitive judgments of learning before taking an assessment, they are actually making two 
judgements; one epistemic and one metacognitive. Individuals must make an epistemic 
judgement about what it means to know in a particular subject area, and then make a 
metacognitive judgement to determine how their current knowledge relates to the expectations of 
the domain. These judgments are likely used to determine when to study, how much time and 
effort to put into studying, and what strategies to employ while studying. 
 Theories of Intelligence. Individuals adopt beliefs (often implicitly) about the nature of 
intelligence, specifically whether intelligence is fixed (entity mindset) or malleable (incremental 
mindset; Dweck, 1999). Individuals that hold an entity mindset tend to believe that intelligence is 
fixed and unchanging. Conversely, those with an incremental mindset tend to endorse the notion 




 Beliefs about the malleability of intelligence likely affect how students engage in learning 
strategies that require more effort. In other words, if a student believes that their ability in 
physics is changeable, then they are more likely to adopt an incremental learning goals approach 
(Dweck, 1999). The mindset that individuals adopt is related to the confidence individuals have 
in their performance. Individuals with an entity mindset tend to make lower predictions of their 
performance than those who adopt an incremental mindset (Hong, Chiu, & Dweck, 1995). 
 Achievement Goal Orientation. The way in which students approach learning within a 
given context is, in part, related to the goals they set for learning. Achievement goal orientations 
(AGOs) are the general orientation a student adopts when engaging in learning within a specific 
context. Within a given learning context there are two types of learning goals that a learner may 
choose to adopt; mastery goals and performance goals (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Elliot & 
Murayama, 2008). Learners who adopt mastery goals tend to focus on developing competencies 
and mastering the new knowledge or skills. On the other hand, learners that adopt performance 
goals tend to focus on demonstrating competence. For each of these goals, learners may adopt 
either an approach or avoidance valence resulting in four distinct achievement goal orientations 
(Elliot & Murayama, 2008). Learners with mastery-approach goals tend to focus on attaining 
task-based competence or mastering conceptual understanding. Learners with mastery-avoidance 
goals tend to focus on avoiding conceptual misunderstandings or developing task-based 
incompetence. Learners with performance-approach goals tend to focus on demonstrating 
normative competence. Learners with performance-avoidance goals tend to focus on avoiding 
demonstrations of normative incompetence.  
 Learners may adopt multiple achievement goals simultaneously and to different extents. 
For example, a student enrolled in an introductory Biology course, and who plans to apply to 




the material) and performance-approach goals (wanting to score in the top quartile of the class). 
As such, these four goal orientations may be thought of as independent constructs. 
 AGOs have been found to be related to measures of course performance (e.g., Elliot & 
Murayama, 2008) and transfer (Belenky & Nokes-Malach, 2013), however few studies have 
looked at the relationship between AGOs and metacognition in general. Both Coutinho (2007) 
and Gul and Shehzad (2012) conducted surveys of students’ metacognition using the 
metacognitive awareness index, which measures metacognitive knowledge and strategies. Both 
studies found that mastery goal orientation was correlated with academic performance (as 
measured by self-reports of GPA) and with metacognitive awareness. However, the effect of 
performance goals on academic achievement and motivation was less clear with Gul and 
Shehzad (2012) finding significant correlations and Coutinho (2007) finding no significant 
correlations. 
 Bipp, Steinmayr, and Spinath (2012) investigated the link between AGOs and 
metacognitive monitoring by having students complete measures of these constructs, estimate 
their intelligence, then complete an intelligence test. They found that students’ performance, but 
not mastery goals, were related to estimates of intelligence. In addition, students with 
performance approach goals tended to overestimate their intelligence while those with 
performance-avoidance goals tended to underestimate their intelligence. However, the estimates 
of intelligence were made using a percentile scale and Likert scales, making the comparison to 
actual scores unwarranted. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This study explores four research questions. First, to what extent is the accuracy of 
metacognitive monitoring related to ability? Second, how does the accuracy of metacognitive 




epistemologically-related beliefs and goal orientations predict changes in accuracy of 
metacognitive judgments of physics exam performance over the course of a semester? Fourth, 
can a simple intervention consisting of metacognitive accuracy feedback, which reminds students 




 Participants were 284 Undergraduate students enrolled in an algebra-based introductory 
physics course at a large Midwestern university who completed consent forms at the beginning 
of the semester agreeing to participate in this study. Due to a glitch in the online survey delivery 
platform demographics data are only available for 164 students. The demographics indicated that 
the sample was relatively evenly distributed for gender (43% female, 57% male), and 
representative of the course distribution for ethnicity (3.0% African American, 21.3% Asian 
American, 12.8% International, 44.5% Caucasian, 5.5% Hispanic, 12.9% other ethnicities). 
Neither the mean age nor socio-economic data were available. Students were randomly assigned 
to either receive feedback about the accuracy of their predictions (feedback condition; N = 141) 
or to a control conditions where they did not receive feedback (no feedback condition; N = 143).  
Procedure  
 Participants completed the surveys during the first week of the semester as part of the 
course delivery system. As part of the course, students completed three computerized exams and 
one comprehensive final exam on paper during the semester. Before beginning each exam, 
students were prompted to make a prediction about their expected performance on the exam 
using the prompt: “Before you begin the exam, please take a second to think about what grade 




prediction.” To motivate accurate metacognitive judgments, students who predicted within 3% of 
their actual exam grade were entered into a drawing for one of three $30 prizes on each exam.  
 Students in the feedback condition received an email, after the exams were graded, that 
reminded them of the prediction they made before the exam and their exam score. They were 
also instructed to compare the prediction and the exam score. Students in the no feedback 
condition did not receive any information about their predictions. 
Measures  
 At the beginning of the semester, students completed surveys that measured their goal 
orientations, theories of intelligence, and epistemological beliefs. The surveys are discussed in 
more detail below. Due to a glitch in the online survey delivery platform, survey data are only 
available for 170 of the students. 
 Goal Orientation. Participants’ achievement goal orientations were measured using the 
Revised Achievement Goal Questionnaire (AGQ) (Elliot & Murayama, 2008). This 
questionnaire is intended to measure the participants’ approach and avoidance behaviors on two 
different goal orientations; performance and mastery goals. The questionnaire asks students to 
consider their goals for the introductory physics course and then rate their agreement to 
statements reflecting the range of goal orientations using a 5-point Likert scale. All four 
subscales have been reported to display high reliability (mastery-approach, α = .84, mastery-
avoidance, α = .88, performance-approach, α = .92, and performance-avoidance, α = .94). The 
reliabilities were lower for this sample (mastery-approach, α = .74, mastery-avoidance, α = .69, 
performance-approach, α = .76, and performance-avoidance, α = .75). The scores were normally 
distributed. To aid in the interpretation of the results, the scores on all four subscales were 




 Epistemological Beliefs. Investigations on epistemological beliefs initially focused on 
developmental issues and assumed that epistemology was unidimensional. Schommer (1990) 
noted that this assumption was unlikely and proposed that that personal epistemology was 
composed of a set of independent beliefs which may be thought of as existing on a continuum 
from less-adaptive to more adaptive positions. Schommer proposed that epistemological beliefs 
are comprised of five dimensions of beliefs that are interrelated; (a) the simplicity/complexity of 
knowledge, (b) the certainty of knowledge, (c) the source of knowledge, (d) innate ability, and 
(e) the speed of learning. Participants’ epistemological beliefs were measured using the 
Connotative Aspects of Epistemological Beliefs questionnaire (CAEB) developed by Stahl and 
Bromme (2007). The CAEB is intended to measure individuals’ epistemological beliefs about 
the simplicity/complexity of knowledge, the certainty of knowledge, and the source of 
knowledge. The questionnaire asks students to indicate how they believe knowledge in physics 
might be best described using a seven-point (1-7) Likert-scale with 24 adjective pairs (e.g., 
negotiated-discovered) as the end-points. On this scale, a score of 1 indicates that knowledge in 
physics is represented by only the first adjective (e.g., negotiated), while a score of 7 indicates 
that knowledge in physics is represented by only the first adjective (e.g., discovered). A score of 
4 indicates that knowledge in physics is represented by both adjectives equally. Two questions 
were removed from the calculation of the scores because their inclusion lowered the reliability of 
the scales. The reliabilities for this sample were acceptable (Simple, α = .74, Certainty, α = .62, 
and Source, α = .61). The scores were normally distributed. To aid in the interpretation of the 
results, the scores on all four subscales were normalized by subtracting the mean and dividing by 
the standard deviation. 
 Theories of Intelligence. Epistemological related beliefs were assessed using the 




about learning in Physics, read 7 philosophical statements, and rate their level of agreement 
using a six-point Likert scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. For example; 
“Your intelligence is something about you that you can't change very much.” The reliability was 
relatively high for this sample (α = .89), and the scores were normally distributed. To aid in the 
interpretation of the results, the scores were normalized by subtracting the mean and dividing by 
the standard deviation.  
 Ability Group. To determine whether high or low performing students show better 
metacognitive calibration or more improvement over time the ability level of each student was 
estimated by calculating their exam average across the four exams. Students were divided into 
quartiles using the average of the four exams. The average exam scores for each quartile were as 
follows: First quartile [35% and 61%], second quartile [61% - 69%], third quartile [69% - 79%], 
and fourth quartile [79% and 99%].  
 Bias. Students’ metacognitive bias was calculated by subtracting their exam score from 
their prediction so that positive scores represent overconfidence and negative scores represent 
underconfidence.  
Data Analysis 
 For ethical reasons, students were not required to make predictions, therefore, not all 
students made predictions for every exam. The majority of the students made predictions for 
every exam. Of the 284 students who consented, 279 made predictions for the first exam, 268 
made predictions for the second exam, 258 made predictions for the third exam, and 241 made 
predictions for the final exam. One student provided letter grade predictions rather than 
percentage predictions. This student’s letter grade predictions were converted to the mean of the 
letter grade (e.g., scores between 86% and 88% are awarded a B, thus an estimate of a B was 




exams given in the course, and an additional 11 students dropped the course after having made at 
least one prediction. The data for these 13 students were not included in the data analysis. 
 The data were relatively normally distributed across all variables, with the exception of 
the goal orientation scores, which were skewed and had a ceiling effect. Therefore, Pearson 
correlations, Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs), Multivariate Analyses of Variance 
(MANOVAs), and Chi-Square tests were used to analyze differences for all variables except goal 
orientation, which were analyzed using Kruskal-Wallis tests. Descriptive statistics, Chi-Square 
tests, Kruskal-Wallis tests, and ANOVAs were calculated with SAS Version 9.4. The trajectory 
of metacognitive bias of exam predictions were tested in an SEM framework to analyze change 
over time. Since there was missing data Mplus Version 7.11 was used to conduct the growth 
curve modeling and growth mixture modeling since the default analysis utilizes full information 
maximum likelihood estimation which handles missing data well.  
 Examination of spaghetti plots suggested non-linear trajectories, so a sequence of models 
was tested to fit the shape of growth. A no-growth model, unconditional growth model, and a 
quadratic growth model were fit using the ML estimator. The models were compared using the 
change in chi-squared test. To assess model fit, we analyzed the CFI, RMSEA, and Chi-Square 
Goodness of fit tests. Cutoffs of CFI ≥ .95 and the lower bound of the 90% CI for RMSEA ≤ .05 
were used to determine the model fit (Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008). These results, along 
with the multiple trajectories suggested by the spaghetti plots indicated that a model with a single 
trajectory for all students was inappropriate, so several growth mixture models were run to 
determine the optimum number of trajectories (classes). Multiple models with different variance 
and covariance structures were fit. However, due to convergence problems with the other 
models, Nagin models were fit to the data where intraclass variances and covariances were fixed 




and cubic slopes were freely estimated using the ML estimator for three of the classes, while 
only the intercept was estimated for the fourth class (i.e., the slope, quadratic, and cubic slopes 
were fixed for this class) because examination of the spaghetti plots suggested a large group of 
students that exhibited no change in bias across the exams.  
Results 
The exams for this course varied in difficulty as the means for the four exams were 
72.2%, 61.3%, 78.5%, and 65.1% respectively. Pearson correlations for all of the variables are 
shown in Table 3.1. Students’ calibration scores among the exams were all positively correlated 
suggesting that the students were relatively consistent in their calibration. Descriptive statistics 
for the bias scores for each feedback condition are shown in Table 3.2. Two-way ANOVAs 
(Ability x Feedback) showed differences in bias between ability groups for exam 1, F(3, 260) = 
46.89, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .34, exam 2, F(3, 256) = 19.87, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .18, exam 3, F(3, 247) = 
8.02, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .09, and exam 4, F(3, 233) = 36.00, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .31. Post-hoc Tukey’s 
HSD tests indicated that the low-ability group was more overconfident than the high-ability 
group and the medium-high ability group on all four exams (See Table 3.2), and the medium-low 
ability group on all but the second exam. The high-ability group was less overconfident than the 
other three ability groups, except for exam 3, where they were only less overconfident than the 
low-ability group.  
A small, but significant main effect for feedback condition was found for exam 4, F(1, 
232) = 4.82, p = .03, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, indicating that those who received metacognitive monitoring 
accuracy feedback were more overconfident on the final exam compared to those who did not 
receive accuracy feedback. However, no differences in bias between feedback conditions were 
detected for exam 1, F(1, 260) < 0.01, p = .98, 𝜂𝑝
2 < .001, exam 2, F(1, 256) = 1.68, p = .20, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
.005, or exam 3, F(1, 247) = 1.40, p = .24, 𝜂𝑝




between ability group and feedback was found for exam 4, F(3, 233) = 2.25, p = .08, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02, 
and is visualized in Figure 3.1. The interaction was not significant for exam 1, F(3, 260) = 1.44, 
p = .23, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, exam 2, F(3, 256) = 1.87, p = .13, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02, or exam 3, F(3, 246) = 1.50, p = 
.22, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02. To investigate the marginally significant interaction term, differences in the bias 
scores between the feedback conditions for each ability group was tested using independent 
samples t-tests. The results indicate that students who received accuracy feedback were more 
overconfident than students who did not receive feedback for the low-ability and medium-low 
ability groups, t(115) = 2.77, p < .01, d = 0.51, but not for the high-ability and medium-high 
ability groups, t(121) = -0.46, p = .65, d = 0.08.  
Figure 3.1. Exam 4 Prediction Bias by Ability and Feedback Condition 
 
The growth curve modeling analysis followed the procedure outlined above. The fit 
indices and change in chi squared tests are shown in Table 3.3. The unconditional linear model 
fit better than the no-growth model. In addition, the quadratic model fit significantly better than 




model was inappropriate to model this data. Because a cubic model could not be fit with only 
four time points, and the spaghetti plots suggest both a cubic model and multiple trajectories, 
growth mixture modeling was conducted to determine the optimum number of classes. The 
results can be found in Table 3.4. 
A four-class model was selected because although the sample-size adjusted BIC was 
slightly higher than the three-class model, the entropy was higher and the resultant models 
reflected the observed patterns in the data from the spaghetti plots more accurately. In the four-
class model 20.7% belonged to the first class, 52.0% belonged to the second, 15.9% belonged to 
the third class, and 11.4% to the fourth. Fitted growth trajectories for the four classes are shown 
in Figure 3.2. Individuals in class 1 had the lowest bias scores on three of the fours exams and 
were relatively consistent across the four exams compared to the other three classes. Individuals 
in both classes 2 and 3 showed similar patterns of large alternating increases and decreases in 
overconfidence across the four exams. Both groups were least overconfident on the third exam, 
and much more overconfident on the other three exams. However, individuals in class 2 were 
between 10 and 20 percentage points more overconfident on every exam than individuals in class 
3. Finally, individuals in class 4 were about 20 percentage points overconfident on the first exam, 
then became more accurate on the second exam, and even displayed underconfidence on the 
third exam. This class was overconfident on the final exam, but notably reduced their bias by 





Table 3.1. Pearson correlations among measured variables   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Bias (Exam 1)            
2. Bias (Exam 2) -.263**           
3. Bias (Exam 3) -.236** -.356**          
4. Bias (Exam 4) -.453** -.459** -.250**         
5. TOI -.070** -.102** -.008** -.158**        
6. Mastery Approach -.072** -.044** -.050** -.049** -.187*       
7. Mastery Avoid -.088** -.024** -.063** -.033** -.124* -.227**      
8. Performance 
Approach 
-.081** -.059** -.005** -.013** -.061* -.319** -.237** 
    
9. Performance Avoid -.036** -.047** -.162** -.081** -.093* -.200** -.419** -.527**    
10. Simple -.029** -.135** -.083** -.211** -.004* -.208** -.097** -.010** -.012   
11. Certain -.060** -.046** -.084** -.100** -.154* -.026** -.090** -.007** -.050 -.300**  
12. Source -.044** -.086** -.050** -.189** -.074* -.119** -.055** -.064** -.063 -.664** .503** 




Table 3.2. Means and Standard Deviation of Bias for Ability Groups by Feedback Condition 
 No Feedback Condition 
Mean(SD) 
 Feedback Condition 
Mean(SD) 
 Low Med-Low Med-High High  Low Med-Low Med-High High 
Exam 1 21.7 (11.4) 12.8 (12.2) 9.8 (10.6) 3.1 (9.3)  24.1 (12.0) 13.3 (10.4) 11.5 (11.1) -1.5 (8.6) 
Exam 2 19.2 (14.4) 17.9 (14.6) 15.1 (15.5) 4.9 (10.1)  27.2 (15.4) 19.4 (15.5) 11.7 (12.7) 6.8 (10.4) 
Exam 3 7.2 (13.2) -2.1 (12.2) 2.3 (12.6) 0.8 (9.7)  7.9 (14.4) -0.2 (9.2) -3.1 (13.1) -3.2 (9.0) 







Table 3.3. Comparative Model Fit across a Series of Models 
Model AIC BIC χ2 df p CFI RMSEA (90% CI) 
A. No-growth model 8365.97 8376.78 240.13 11 < .001 -.517 .277 .242, .314 
B. Unconditional linear growth model 8314.31 8335.92 182.47 8 < .001 -.156 .284 .241, .327 
      χ2 test of difference vs. Model A   57.66 3 < .001    
C. Unconditional quadratic model 8293.20 8329.22 153.35 4 < .001 .011 .371 .312, .432 




Table 3.4. Comparative Model Fit across a Series of Models 
Models AIC BIC Sample-Size Adjusted BIC Entropy Smallest Class Percentage 
Model 1 (1 class) Did not converge 
Model 2 (2 class) 8196.25 8253.89 8203.16 .611 33.1 
Model 3 (3 class) 8176.81 8266.86 8187.59 .601 14.6 
Model 4 (4 class) 8180.20 8306.07 8195.10 .615 11.4 






Figure 3.2. Fitted Growth Trajectories for Calibration for the Four Classes 
 
 To investigate the demographic characteristics of the individuals in each class trajectory 
three Chi-Square tests of independence were conducted. There were no differences in class 
membership between feedback condition, χ2(3) = 4.40, p = .22. However, there were significant 
differences in class membership by ability group, χ2(9) = 135.51, p < .001. Students in class 3, 
the most overconfident class, were primarily students in the bottom quartile (77%) and did not 
include any students in the top quartile. Conversely, students in class 1, the most accurate class, 
were primarily students in the top quartile (66%), and only included two students from the 
bottom quartile. The four ability groups were all represented in class 4, as 23% were from the 
lowest quartile, 29% from the second quartile, 32% from the third quartile, and 16% from the top 
quartile. Students in class 2 were also relatively evenly represented among the ability groups, 




 To investigate potential characteristics that might determine class membership, 
differences between the trajectory classes were investigated. A one-way ANOVA was conducted 
to investigate differences in theories of intelligence, and a one-way MANOVA was conducted to 
investigate differences in epistemological beliefs. Class membership did not differ by TOI, F(3, 
163) = 1.56, p = .20, or by epistemological beliefs, F(3, 163) = 0.37, p = .78. Because the 
distributions for academic goal orientations were not normally distributed, four Kruskal-Wallis 
tests were conducted to investigate differences in academic goal orientations with a Bonferroni 
correction made to the critical alpha level such that α = 0.012. Class membership did not differ 
by Mastery Approach, χ2(3) = 2.35, p = .50, Mastery Avoidance goals, χ2(3) = 7.78, p = .05, 
Performance Approach, χ2(3) = 1.45, p = .69, or Performance Avoidance, χ2(3) = 1.10, p = .78.  
Discussion 
 This study is the first to model changes in metacognitive calibration using growth 
mixture modeling, and, along with Foster, et al., (2017), among the first studies to investigate 
changes in metacognitive calibration using person-centered techniques. Similar to Foster, et al. 
(2017), this study found that individual changes in metacognitive calibration vary greatly across 
individuals. As such, person centered analyses (e.g., multi-level or hierarchical modeling) may 
be more appropriate for identifying individual factors which are related to the ability to improve 
one’s metacognitive monitoring. In addition, four classes were found to model changes in 
metacognitive bias across four exams. Although three of these classes did not exhibit significant 
decreases in bias, the fourth class – consisting of just over 11% of the students – demonstrated 
improved bias over the course of the semester.  
 Many models of self-regulation indicate that metacognitive monitoring is related to the 




Winne & Hadwin, 1998). These models suggest that interventions aimed at improving 
metacognitive monitoring and calibration may also need to address these other factors as well. 
When making predictions about upcoming exam grades, students must have substantial 
knowledge both within and about the domain in which the task is situated in order to make 
accurate predictions (Veenman, et al., 2006). This suggests that prediction accuracy should rely 
on the accuracy of beliefs about knowledge within a domain as well as accurate metacognitive 
monitoring. In this study, academic goal orientations correlated with epistemological beliefs and 
theories of intelligence. Students who were more likely to report that they held a mastery-
approach orientation were also more likely to report that ability was changeable and that 
knowledge in physics was integrated, connected, and incomplete. However, there was not a 
consistent correlation between metacognitive bias, and epistemological beliefs, theories of 
intelligence, or academic goal orientations. In addition, these constructs were not predictive of 
class membership. This suggests that metacognitive monitoring accuracy (at least as measured 
by bias using single global exam predictions) may be orthogonal to these constructs.  
Alternatively, it could be that the relationship between these constructs and metacognitive 
monitoring accuracy may be obscured by the variation in exam difficulty, which made it more 
difficult to use prior exam performance to make accurate predictions about future exam 
performance.  
 Consistent with prior research, this study found that metacognitive bias was related to 
ability (Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004; Kruger & Dunning, 1999). Specifically, the lowest 
performing students were the least accurate, and were consistently overconfident, while the 
highest performing individuals were the most accurate and tended towards underconfidence. This 




consistently well calibrated (i.e., bias close to zero) on every exam. In contrast, students in the 
bottom quartile were more likely to be in class 3, which was consistently poorly calibrated and 
overconfident by one to three letter grades on every exam. In other words, students who earned 
D’s and F’s on the exams, generally came into the exam believing that they were going to earn 
B’s and C’s. While students in classes 2 and 4 were represented by students of all ability groups, 
at least 60% of the class membership was from the two middle ability groups. Students in class 4 
improved their grades on the last three exams by about ten percentage points compared to the 
first exam, however their bias decreased by more than 20 percentage points. This suggests that 
the improvements in monitoring accuracy was a result of both improving performance and 
metacognition monitoring. Alternatively, the observed improvements in performance could be 
the result of improved monitoring accuracy. Future research should look to investigate these 
possibilities.  
 One common explanation for the pattern where individuals overestimate their own 
performance on exams, with the overestimates being more pronounced for low-performing 
students is that the expertise and skills needed to produce good performance on a task are the 
same type of expertise and skills needed to produce accurate judgments of performance 
(Schlosser, et al., 2013). In other words, low-performing students suffer from the dual curse of 
being both unskilled and unaware of their lack of skill (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). This 
interpretation suggests that providing students with feedback about the accuracy of their exam 
predictions may help students gain metacognitive awareness, which could either help students 
improve their performance, or at least to regulate their overconfidence. However, in this study, 




paradoxically, the results suggest that providing students with accuracy feedback may have 
resulted in greater overconfidence by low-performing students. 
 While this study was not designed to investigate the causes for inflated overconfidence, 
there are a few possible explanations for this finding. One explanation is that providing students 
with feedback about prediction accuracy does not help them develop productive study strategies. 
Prior research has found that low-performing students tend to utilize more passive and less 
effective study strategies when studying for exams (Hartwig & Dunlosky, 2012; Karpicke, Butler 
& Roediger, 2009). Providing students with prediction feedback may prompt students to engage 
in more studying using the same ineffective strategies that they were using, then use the increase 
in the amount of study time to make higher predictions about exam performance. In other words, 
low-performing students may make overconfident predictions on subsequent exams because they 
engaged in more studying than for previous exams, even though the additional studying was not 
helpful in improving performance. This explanation is consistent with recent experimental 
findings showing that providing low-performing students with feedback about the accuracy of 
their self-assessments led to greater overconfidence and less accurate control choices 
(Raaijmakers, Baars, Paas, van Merrienboer, & van Gog, 2019). 
 Alternatively providing feedback about prediction accuracy may cause students to make 
overconfident predictions in an attempt to maintain a positive self-image. A final explanation is 
that students who received feedback may have been more likely to use the feedback from the 
third exam, which was also the easiest exam, when making predictions for the final exam. 
Because this was an unexpected finding, future research should attempt to replicate this finding 
using experimental methods designed to investigate students’ study habits and the reasons for 




 Should this finding prove to be robust, it would suggest that interventions aimed at 
improving calibration need to be sensitive to differences in ability levels. Lower-performing 
students may need interventions that incorporate reality checks, such as required practice tests 
that ask students to predict their performance followed by accuracy feedback and suggested 
study strategies. While much of the literature on metacognitive calibration has focused on the 
correlations with performance, the extent to which overconfidence or underconfidence are 
related to availing constructs such as self-efficacy or persistence has not been extensively 
studied. For example, students who make overconfident predictions may exhibit overconfidence, 
in part, to maintain a positive self-image. If their overconfidence is related to their self-efficacy 
for a task, overconfidence could potentially encourage persistence, as long as the student can 
maintain a reasonable level of success. 
 Another area for future research is the degree to which low-performing students 
demonstrate metacognitive awareness. While inaccurate metacognitive predictions could indicate 
a lack of awareness, it may also simply reflect a lack of understanding of the material that will 
appear on the exam. One way to measure metacognitive awareness could be to look at how 
individuals change their estimate of performance after taking an exam. A student who initially 
overpredicts may demonstrate metacognitive awareness by adjusting their estimate downward 
after completing an exam. If Kruger and Dunning (1999) are correct in asserting that lower 
performing individuals are less accurate in their metacognitive monitoring, then we would expect 
higher performing individuals to make more appropriate adjustments in their performance 
estimates from before the exam to after the exam. Future research should have students make 
predictions both before and after an exam to determine who is more accurate in adjusting their 




 There were limitations to this study. First, due to the survey delivery system crash, 
measures of goal orientation, theories of intelligence, demographic information was obtained for 
about 60% of the sample. While the demographic data of those that completed the surveys was 
representative of the entire course, there may be a systematic difference on these measures 
between those who complete assignments early and those who wait until later in the week to 
complete their assignments. The lack of association between the motivational variables we 
collected and the trajectories of growth suggests the need to search for other covariates. For 
example, it is likely that an individual’s prediction before knowing the specific questions on an 
exam is influenced by both their metacognitive abilities and their epistemological beliefs about 
the complexity of knowledge and the speed of learning. Future work should investigate the effect 
of epistemological beliefs on initial metacognitive accuracy and improvement over time. Finally, 






CHAPTER 4: THE EFFECT OF VIEWING SOLUTION VIDEOS ON 
METACOGNITIVE MONITORING ACCURACY 
 Only about half of all students who enroll in a STEM major will graduate having 
completed a STEM degree (Chen, 2013). In response, there has been a large focus on finding 
ways to support and retain students enrolled in STEM majors (e.g., Dai & Cromley, 2014; 
Graham, Federick, Byars-Winston, Hunter, & Handelsman, 2013; Watkins & Mazur, 2013). One 
approach to this problem has been finding ways to support lower-performing students in 
introductory courses because grades earned in these early courses are a very strong predictor of  
persistence within STEM majors (Cromley, Perez, & Kaplan, 2016; King, 2015). 
 Within STEM, many students find introductory calculus-based physics difficult to learn, 
as students must be able to solve problems that require them to apply concepts and mathematical 
procedures in order to answer both calculational and conceptual questions. To learn these 
techniques successfully, students must actively engage in problem-solving to develop organized 
and integrated conceptual schemas and automate their procedural knowledge. However, students 
tend to prefer using passive methods, such as rereading and reviewing notes, (Blasiman, 
Dunlosky, & Rawson, 2017; Hartwig & Dunlosky, 2012). When students do engage in problem 
solving, they often utilize methods that focus on memorizing formulas, or attempting to match 
the surface features to other problems that they have solved (Bing & Redish, 2009; Hegde & 
Meera, 2012; Walsh, Howard, Bowe, 2007). Novice students also tend to take means-ends 
approaches to solving problems, such as working backwards from a goal-state by reducing the 
difference between the initial state and the goal-state (Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 




equation hunting, where students look for equations that contain the to-be-solved-for variables 
(Hegde & Meera, 2012; Meijer, Veenman, & Hout-Wolters, 2006). 
 One reason that students might tend to prefer passive methods or means-ends approaches 
is that they get stuck and are not able to make progress when solving problems outside of their 
current ability. Presenting students with worked-examples is one option that has shown promise 
for supporting students in solving well-defined computational and procedural problems (e.g., 
Kalyuga, Chandler, Tuovinen, & Sweller, 2001; Nievelstein, van Gog, van Dijck, & Boshuizen, 
2013), particularly when one-on-one tutoring and instructor office hours are a limited resource. 
Worked Example Effect 
 A common technique for teaching students how to solve calculational or procedural 
problems is to engage students in studying worked-examples that provide students with the entire 
solution procedure. Much of the research has focused on static worked examples, such as those 
commonly found in textbooks (e.g., Kalyuga, Ayres, Chandler, & Sweller, 2003; Sweller & 
Cooper, 1985; van Gog, Kester, & Paas, 2011). However, with advances in technology, worked-
examples can be dynamically presented through video or animated solutions, through interactive 
help links, or within cognitive tutoring systems (Belski & Belski, 2013; Belski & Belski, 2016; 
Mestre, Morphew, & Gladding, 2015; Schwonke, et al., 2009), which have been found to be 
more effective than static worked examples (Lusk & Atkinson, 2007). 
 The worked-example effect describes the robust finding that studying worked examples 
is more effective at teaching novices and low-performing students how to solve well-structured 
problem-solving tasks than only engaging in problem-solving (Booth, McGinn, Young, & 
Barbieri, 2015; Sweller & Cooper, 1985), or engaging in tutored problem-solving (Salden, 




better prepare students for learning as compared to working on open-ended problems (Glogger-
Frey, Fleischer, Gruny, Kappich, & Renkl, 2015). Worked examples are especially effective 
when combined with self-explanation or analogical comparison prompts (Badeau, White, 
Ibrahim, Ding, & Heckler, 2017; Chi, 1996). 
 However, worked examples are less effective, and can even be detrimental for higher-
performing students (Bokosmaty, Sweller, & Kalyuga, 2015). This finding, known as the 
expertise reversal effect, has been noted where experts and more knowledgeable novices, such as 
high performing introductory students, tend to learn more from solving problems with feedback 
than from worked examples (Cooper, Tindall-Ford, Chandler, & Sweller, 2001; Lee & Kalyuga 
2014; Leppink, Broers, Imbos, van der Vleuten, & Berger, 2012; McNamara, Kintsch, Songer, & 
Kintsch, 1996). In addition, worked examples that require students to attend to multiple sources 
of information, or that provide students with redundant information, are ineffective (Tarmizi & 
Sweller, 1988; Ward & Sweller, 1990). 
 The worked example effect is generally interpreted through the lens of cognitive load 
theory, in which learning is constrained by limitations in working memory capacity. The amount 
of information elements that are processed in working memory at any time determines the 
cognitive load experienced by the learner. Current views of cognitive load theory distinguish 
three sources of cognitive load; extrinsic, intrinsic, and germane (Sweller, Ayers, & Kalyuga, 
2011). Intrinsic cognitive load refers to the load imposed by the intrinsic nature of the task, or as 
Sweller (2010) defines it, intrinsic load is the number of interacting elements that must be 
simultaneously processed to understand and learn the material. As one learns, schemas are 




 Cognitive load that is imposed by the design of the learning task rather than from the 
content itself is either extrinsic or germane load. Extrinsic load is load imposed by the design of 
the learning task that is unnecessary for learning in that it does not directly related to schema 
construction (Sweller, et al., 2011). For example, students engaging in equation hunting (i.e., 
searching for equations with the needed variables) is a task characterized by high extraneous load 
because it imposes a high load on working memory and does not lead to enhanced schema 
development. Conversely, germane load refers to the load imposed by the design of the learning 
task that is directly related to schema acquisition and automation (Sweller, 2010). 
 The benefits of worked examples for novices and low-performing students is thought to 
occur from reductions in extrinsic cognitive load and increases in germane cognitive load 
(Sweller, 1988; Ward & Sweller, 1990). In addition, worked examples have been found to be 
associated with increases in learner motivation (Paas, Tuovinen, van Merrienboer, & Darabi, 
2005), and increases in the efficiency with which novices’ process information needed to 
develop general conceptual understanding (Salden, Koedinger, Renkl, Aleven, & McLaren, 
2010). These explanations have also been extended to explain the expertise-reversal effect such 
that the presentation of already known or no longer needed procedural reminders are processed 
as redundant information which may increase the extrinsic load for higher-ability learners thus 
limiting, or even reversing, the benefits from studying worked examples (Kalyuga & Renkl, 
2010; Lee & Kalyuga, 2014). However methods for presenting worked examples that require the 
student to engage in actively building their conceptual schemas, such as, interleaving problem 
solving and worked examples, fading worked examples, and presenting incomplete worked-
examples may be beneficial for higher-performing individuals (Atkinson, Renkl, & Merril, 2003; 





 Metacognition is the act of thinking and reflecting on one’s cognitive processes, and is 
commonly divided into metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive skills such as monitoring 
and control. In authentic self-regulated learning contexts, it is generally believed that there is a 
dynamic and reciprocal relationship between metacognitive monitoring and control processes 
such that learners monitor their current knowledge state against a context-dependent, and task-
specific, criteria in order to plan and enact effective study strategies (Ariel, Dunlosky, & Bailey, 
2009; Metcalfe & Kornell, 2005). Due to learners’ reliance on monitoring their ability in order to 
make effective metacognitive control decisions, the accuracy of students’ metacognitive 
monitoring (i.e., how closely their estimate of their ability matches their current ability) is 
paramount in self-regulated learning contexts. As such, it is important for interventions aimed at 
helping students prepare for course exams to investigate how the interventions impact students’ 
metacognitive monitoring. 
 Metacognitive monitoring is typically studied by asking learners to make judgments 
about the current state of their learning at various points in the learning process (Dunlosky & 
Thiede, 2013). Two of these judgments are particularly relevant for studying interventions aimed 
at helping students prepare for exams; judgments of learning (JOLs) and retrospective 
confidence judgments (RCJs). JOLs are made after learning the material (viewing the animated 
worked examples in this case), but before attempting to solve new problems, while RCJs are 
made after attempting to solve the problems. Students are likely to make judgments about the 
state of their learning after viewing worked examples and after attempting to solve problems. 




determine their future studying behavior (Ariel, Dunlosky, & Bailey, 2009; Castel, Benjamin, 
Craik, and Watkins, 2002). 
Early theories concerning the basis for judgments of metacognitive monitoring posited 
that individuals directly monitored the state of their cognition. This explanation, termed the 
direct-access hypothesis, predicts the strong relationship that is observed between metacognitive 
judgments and objective performance. However, this view fails to account for the presence of 
pervasive metacognitive illusions that suggest that beliefs about memory and metacognitive 
judgments are independent of objective measures of memory (Bjork, 1999; Kornell, Rhodes, 
Castel, & Tauber, 2011). Current theories of metacognition tend to adopt the cue-utilization 
approach, which asserts that metacognitive judgments are made through inferential processes 
that utilize beliefs about the connection between learning and cues (e.g., Koriat, 1997).  
In the cue-utilization framework, individuals make metacognitive judgments integrating 
information from both theory-based cues and heuristic-based cues (Ariel & Dunlosky, 2011; 
Dinsmore & Parkinson, 2013; Jersakova, Allen, Booth, Souchay, & O’Connor, 2017), and the 
extent to which each cue type influences metacognitive judgments is a function of the learning 
context, motivation of the learner, and the attributions that learners make (Koriat, Nussinson, & 
Ackerman, 2014). Theory-based cues are related to the characteristics of the task, the to be 
learned items, or the learning conditions that one assumes to be related to difficulty of learning. 
Heuristic-based cues are implicit cues that learners implicitly employ as indicators concerning 
the degree to which items have been learned, such as, the familiarity of the content or the fluency 
with which they encode the material.  
 While many theory-based cues can be availing, others can be harmful for learning. For 




beneficial than distributed and interleaved study (Schmidt & Bjork, 1992), and that additional 
study sessions will lead to better retention than engaging in testing (Kornell & Son, 2009). The 
use of availing theory-based cues when making studying decisions likely differ between high- 
and low-performing students. For example, high-performing students are more likely to use 
testing as a study strategy (Hartwig & Dunlosky, 2012). 
 Students also often implicitly use heuristic-based cues, such as familiarity and fluency, 
when engaged in metacognitive monitoring to make judgments about the progress of their 
learning. The fluency with which individuals process information is related to metacognitive 
judgments with individuals making higher metacognitive judgments in memory tasks for easier 
to read words and images (Besken, 2016; Mueller, Dunlosky, Tauber, & Rhodes, 2014; Rhodes 
& Castel, 2008; Yue, Castel, & Bjork, 2013), in comprehension tasks for fluently presented 
lectures or easier to process text (Carpenter, Wilford, Kornell, & Mullaney, 2013; Ozuru, Kurby, 
& McNamara, 2012; Serra & Magreehan, 2016; Toftness, et al., 2018; Zaromb, Karpicke, & 
Roediger, 2010), or in knowledge tasks for questions with familiar terms (Reder & Ritter, 1992), 
even when these cues are not diagnostic of learning. The fluency with which an item is retrieved 
from memory is also related to metacognitive judgments (Ackerman & Zalmanov, 2012; 
Benjamin & Bjork, 1996; Koriat, & Ma’ayan, 2005). For example, individuals predicting their 
ability to recall answers from a general knowledge test will often give the highest judgments to 
the items they answered most quickly, however they recall more items that take longer to answer 
(Benjamin, Bjork, & Schwartz, 1998). This is particularly relevant for physics courses where 
common misconceptions are often fluently retrieved. 
 Previous studies have found that worked examples increase students’ self-efficacy for 




impact of studying worked-examples on the accuracy of students’ metacognitive judgments. It 
may be that providing low-performing students with expert solutions will make explicit the 
discrepancy between their current level of understanding and the level of understanding expected 
in the course. Alternatively, the reduction of cognitive load from viewing the solution videos 
may also increase the fluency with which individuals process the information given the 
additional working memory capacity. In addition, because students are viewing the solution 
videos when reviewing for exams rather than during initial learning the solutions may present 
highly familiar procedures. If students overuse the familiarity and fluency cues presented in 
animated worked examples, they may develop an “illusion of understanding” in which they 
believe that they have learned the material and will be able to appropriately apply the solution 
method to a new problem, because they were able to understand the example (Bjork, 1999; Mills 
& Keil, 2004). 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This study explores four research questions across three experiments. First, to what extent 
do students learn from viewing ANSVs for conceptual vs calculational problems? Second, how 
does viewing ANSVs affect the metacognitive accuracy of students’ retrospective confidence 
judgments (RCJs) made after solving calculational and conceptual problems? Third, how does 
attempting to solve problems before viewing the solutions affect learning or metacognitive 








Experiment 1  
Participants 
 An email was sent to the 297 students enrolled in the introductory calculus-based 
mechanics course who had performed in the bottom third on the first course exam (that is, scored 
less than 76%). The email invited these students to participate in a study evaluating the 
usefulness of an intervention aimed at helping students prepare for the upcoming midterm 
examination. Forty-two students volunteered and 38 completed both sessions.  
Materials 
 Animated-Narrated Solution Video (ANSV) Design4. The ANSVs were designed to 
reduce extraneous cognitive load and increase germane cognitive load by adhering to multimedia 
learning principles (Mayer, 2002; Mayer & Moreno, 2003). For example, information was 
presented using both aural and visual channels, however, care was taken to ensure that the 
information presented across the two channels was coherent, but not redundant to avoid 
interference between people’s visual and aural channels. In addition, the solution steps were 
animated so that the information was presented in small coherent segments.  
 The solution videos begin by showing an animation of the physical scenario described in 
the problem, while the narration describes the physics concepts and principles that apply to the 
scenario (see Figure 4.1). This provides students with a model for how experts approach solving 
problems in physics. In addition, this approach encourages students to engage in mental 
simulation of the problem and to engage in a conceptual analysis of the problem, rather than 
engage in a means-end analysis approach to the problem, such as equation hunting.  
  
                                                 
4 All ANSVs used in Experiments 1 and 3 can be found at: http://hdl.handle.net/2142/103223.  




Figure 4.1. Example of the animation of the physical scenario. Animations are accompanied by 
a conceptual analysis of the problem. In this problem, (a) there is an exchange between 
gravitational potential energy and kinetic energy as the block slides down the ramp. Then, (b) 
work is done by a non-conservative force (friction) as the block slows down over the region of 
friction. Finally, (c) there is an exchange between kinetic energy and spring potential energy 
 
 After orienting students to the problem, the ANSVs present students with the solutions 
using a two-column style similar to ones previously used in PER studies (Docktor, Strand, 




column discussing the concepts being applied, and the right column providing the equation that 
instantiates the concept (see Figure 4.2). That is, the solution always presented students with the 
concept or procedure that was being applied in the left column, and then discussed the 
mathematical instantiation of the concept in the right column. This approach reinforces the 
conceptual analysis approach to problem-solving as well as integrating the conceptual and  
procedural knowledge required to solve the problems by making explicit links between the 
conceptual knowledge and the mathematical implementations. While the solution steps were 
being presented animations were used to direct the students’ attention to relevant portions of the 
ANSVs, because the use of animations as visual cues has been shown to help direct learners’ 
attention and can facilitate learning (De Koning, Tabbers, Rikers, & Paas, 2007; 2010). 
Figure 4.2. Example of the two-column ANSV style. The solution steps are animated to reduce 
cognitive load, but maintained so that students can review the entire solution. The conceptual 
ideas or procedures found the in the right-hand column, are discussed and appear before the 





 Once the mathematical formulas were established, the algebraic steps to obtain the final 
solutions were explicitly carried out. These steps were animated using motions that reinforced 
the mathematical processes that were carried out. For example, when adding a term to both sides 
of an equation the term in the solution moved to the other side, or when finding the cross-product 
of vectors, the vectors appeared and were manipulated on the screen. The aim of these 
animations was to reduce students’ memory load by presenting the steps sequentially, as well as 
to reinforce the mathematical concept through the animation. In addition, all of the steps were 
maintained in the video so that students would have a complete solution to review without the 
need to rewatch the entire solution.  
 Performance measures. Student performance was assessed using a pre-test and a post-
test using six calculational and five conceptual physics problems covering center of mass, 
conservation of energy, conservation of momentum, and work. All of the questions used in 
Experiment 1 can be found in Appendix B. Calculational problems required students to calculate 
algebraic or numeric solutions. Problems were scored correct if the answers were correct, or if 
the student made only one minor algebraic or arithmetic error in computing the solution (e.g., 
making a rounding error on a multistep problem). Conceptual questions were multiple-choice 
problems that required students to apply their conceptual understanding to determine what 
change, if any, would occur if there was a change in the problem’s initial conditions. For these 
questions, students needed to select the correct answer and to explain their answer. Conceptual 
questions were scored as correct if the correct answer was selected and a correct explanation was 
provided. All of the questions were scored by two independent graders with an initial interrater 




 Retrospective Confidence Judgments (RCJs). After attempting to solve each problem 
on the pre- and post-tests participants were asked to make RCJs using the following wording: 
“Circle the number which represents how confident you are that your answer is correct.” RCJs 
were made using a five-point scale (i.e., 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 100%). This scale was utilized so 
that the confidence judgments would be made in the same scale as the measures of performance. 
A single RCJ score was computed by taking the mean of the individual confidence judgments.   
 Metacognitive Judgment Accuracy. The accuracy of the metacognitive judgments is 
often measured by examining the calibration of student judgments. Calibration, also known as 
absolute accuracy, refers to the ability to make judgments that accurately reflect performance 
(Rhodes, 2015). In a learning context, calibration is related to the ability for students to judge 
when their learning is sufficient to meet the goals they have set for the task. In this study, 
calibration was measured using bias. Bias was calculated for each participant by subtracting the 
performance (i.e., the percent of questions answered correctly) from the RCJ.  
Because bias is a signed measure of calibration, it indicates whether a judgment is higher or 
lower than performance allowing for the examination of overconfidence and underconfidence. In 
this study, bias was calculated so that positive bias indicates overconfidence and negative bias 
indicates under confidence.  
Procedure 
The experiment was completed over two 2-hour sessions to minimize student fatigue. 
Within each session, participants completed a pre-test where they solved both calculational and 
conceptual physics problems and made RCJs for each problem. After attempting all of the 
problems, the participants viewed ANSVs for the calculational and conceptual problems that 




and conceptual physics problems similar to the problems in the ANSVs. All students completed 
the second course exam one day after completing the second session. 
Analytical Methods 
In general students provided RCJs after attempting every problem on the pre- and post-
tests. Only 1.9% of the individual questions did not have RCJs, and the percentage of missing 
RCJs ranged from 0% for most questions to 7.8% for a single question on the post-test. There 
were no patterns in the missing data, nor did missingness correlate with any dependent variable 
used in the study, therefore the data was assumed to be missing at random. Because only 76% of 
the participants made RCJs for every question, traditional methods for handling missing data, 
such as, casewise deletion, or mean imputation are considered inappropriate (Enders, 2010; 
Peugh & Enders, 2004; Sinharay, Stern, & Russell, 2001). The missing data was addressed by 
employing multiple imputation procedures for the missing RCJs (Gottschall, West, & Enders, 
2012; Schafer & Graham, 2002). Multiple imputation was conducted using proc mi for SAS 
version 9.4. Since RCJs were made using a discrete choice scale, the missing data were imputed 
treating student scores for each question as multinomial categorical data. Twenty datasets were 
imputed using a fully conditional specification. Visual inspection of the trace plots and the 
autocorrelation plots indicated that the imputation model converged. Analyses were conducted 
on each data set and pooled using proc mianalyze for SAS version 9.4. 
Results 
The mean performance, RCJ, and bias on the pre and post assessments are given in Table 
4.1. The distribution of the difference scores for performance on the assessment deviated from 
normality for both calculational and conceptual questions, therefore non-parametric Wilcoxon 




pre-test to the post-test. The distribution of the difference scores for RCJs and bias were 
normally distributed for both calculational and conceptual questions, so dependent-samples t-
tests were conducted to determine how viewing the ANSVs affected metacognitive confidence 
and accuracy. Effect sizes were calculated using Cohen’s d for repeated measures (dz), which are 
interpreted similar to Cohen’s d for independent samples. 
Figure 4.3. Mean Performance and RCJs on the pre and post assessments 
 
The results indicate that viewing ANSVs had a large effect on both performance and 
confidence. Students scored almost 40 percentage points higher on the post-test for calculational 
problems, S = 315.00, p < 0.001, dz = 1.66, and 22 percentage points higher for conceptual 
problems, S = 189.00, p < 0.001, dz = 1.11. Students were also more confident as indicated by 
higher RCJs for both calculational, t(37) = 9.10, p < 0.001, dz = 1.48, and conceptual problems, 
t(37) = 5.60, p = 0.001, dz = 0.91. The accuracy of student confidence after viewing ANSVs 
improved, as seen in the decrease in the difference between the performance and confidence bars 
in Figure 4.3. Bias scores decreased for both calculational, t(37) = -3.98, p < 0.001, dz = 0.65, 





Table 4.1. Mean Performance, RCJ, Bias, and Calibration on the Pre and Post Assessments 
 Pre-Test  Post-Test 
Measure M SD  M SD 
Performance      
   Calculational 37.3 26.7  75.9 23.5 
   Conceptual 44.2 26.8  66.8 26.4 
Confidence      
   Calculational 48.5 20.4  71.6 17.9 
   Conceptual 62.0 17.4  76.5 14.8 
Bias      
   Calculational 11.3 21.5  -4.2 18.0 
   Conceptual 17.8 22.7  9.7 20.2 
 
Discussion 
 Students in Experiment 1 demonstrated improved performance for calculational 
problems, scoring almost 40 percentage points higher on the post test. This is consistent with 
prior work that has demonstrated that worked solutions are effective for students learning how to 
solve calculational problems (Booth, McGinn, Young, & Barbieri, 2015; Mestre, Morphew & 
Gladding, 2015; Schwonke, et al., 2009). In addition, students also scored about 22 percentage 
points higher for conceptual problems, extending the benefit for worked examples to problems 
requiring conceptual reasoning to solve. In addition, students were less overconfident in their 
solutions, making more accurate RCJs after viewing the ANSVs. Students were overconfident by 
more than 11 percentage points on the pre-test for both calculational and conceptual problems. 
On the post-test students were slightly underconfident for calculational problems and reduced 
their overconfidence on conceptual problems by almost half. 
 However, the students were engaged in active problem solving, and received correctness 
feedback, in addition to viewing ANSVs. As such, Experiment 1 does not allow for the isolation 
of the effect of viewing the ANSVs from the effect of receiving feedback after attempting to 
solve problems. It is possible that much of the observed learning gains were due in large part to 




al., 2012; McDermott, et al., 2014). In addition, the observed improvement in metacognitive 
calibration may be due to the underconfidence with practice effect, where individuals tend to be 
overconfident on the first trial of a task, but see their overconfidence decline, even to point of 
becoming underconfident as soon as the second trial (Finn & Metcalfe, 2007; Koriat, Sheffer, & 
Ma’ayan, 2002; Serra & Dunlosky, 2005).  
 Experiments 2 and 3 address these issues by randomly assigning students to either 
attempt the problem before viewing the ANSVs, or to view the ANSVs without attempting to 
solve the problems. If the observed learning gains are largely due to the problem solving with 
correctness feedback then the students who attempt the problems before viewing the solutions 
would be expected to demonstrate larger learning gains. In addition, the underconfidence with 
practice effect predicts that students who attempt the problems before viewing the solutions 
would also have lower bias scores than students who only watch the videos.  
 Finally, the problems on the post-test were highly similar to those attempted on the pre-
test and whose solutions were shown in the ANSVs. The effect of viewing ANSVs on the ability 
to transfer to new problem types has not been previously explored. It is also unclear how viewing 
ANSVs affects the accuracy of students’ metacognitive judgments concerning their ability to 
transfer their learning to solve conceptual transfer problems. Experiment 2 examines the effect of 
attempting to solve problems before viewing ANSVs on the ability to solve similar calculational 
physics problems as well as conceptual transfer problems. 
Experiment 2 
Participants 
 A recruitment email was sent to the 373 students enrolled in the introductory mechanics 




course at a large Midwestern University (that is, the average exam score was below 76%). 
Seventy students volunteered and were randomly assigned to either attempt to solve calculational 
physics problems before viewing the solution videos (“attempt first” condition) or to only watch 
the solution videos without attempting the problems (“view only” condition). Of these students, 
60 participants completed both sessions. For logistical reasons, the random assignment was done 
before the first session, however the conditions differed in attendance resulting in 26 participants 
in the “attempt first” condition, and 34 participants in the “view only” condition. Only the data 
from the 60 participants who completed both sessions were included in the data analysis.  
In general students provided RCJs after attempting every problem on the pre- and post-
tests. Only 2.8% of the individual questions did not have RCJs, and the percentage of missing 
RCJs ranged from 0% for most questions to 10% for a single calculational question on the post-
test. There were no patterns in the missing data, nor did missingness correlate with any 
dependent variable used in the study, therefore the data was assumed to be missing at random. 
Complete data was available for 68%, therefore missing data was handled using multiple 
imputation as described above.  
Materials 
 The pre-test consisted of nine calculational physics problems. The post-test consisted of 
nine calculational physics problems similar to the problems covered in the ANSVs, and eight 
conceptual transfer problems. All of the questions used in Experiment 2 can be found in 
Appendix C. The calculational problems required students to calculate algebraic or numeric 
solutions. Problems were scored correct if the answers were correct, or if the student made only 
one minor algebraic or arithmetic error in computing the solution (e.g., rounding errors on 




required the participants to apply conceptual reasoning that was discussed in the ANSVs. For 
these questions, students needed to select the correct answer and to explain their answer. 
Conceptual questions scored as correct if the correct answer was selected and an appropriate 
explanation provided. All of the questions were scored by two independent graders with an 
initial interrater agreement of 95%. Following discussion, 100% agreement was reached. 
Procedure 
The experiment was completed over two sessions to minimize student fatigue as in 
Experiment 1. The problems and ANSVs covered topics that would appear on the third course 
exam (i.e., rotational motion, angular kinematics, and angular momentum). Participants in the 
“attempt first” condition completed a pre-test where they solved difficult calculational physics 
problems and made RCJs for each problem, then viewed ANSVs for the calculational problems 
that they had just attempted. After viewing all of the solutions, participants were asked to make a 
Judgement of Learning (JOL) by indicating how many problems similar to the problems in the 
ANSVs they would now be able to correctly solve. Finally, the participants completed a post-test 
consisting of calculational physics problems similar to the problems covered in the ANSVs and 
conceptual “transfer” problems, making RCJs for each problem.  
Participants in the “view only” condition answered nine survey questions about their 
typical study habits, then viewed the same ANSVs as the “attempt first” condition after 
answering the survey questions. After viewing all of the solutions, participants were asked to 
make a JOL by indicating how many problems similar to the problems in the ANSVs they would 
now be able to correctly solve. Finally, the participants completed a post-test consisting of 




“transfer” problems. Metacognitive accuracy was measured using bias as described in 
Experiment 1. 
Results  
Descriptive statistics for course exam performance, pre- and post-test performance, JOLs, 
and RCJs are given in Table 4.2, while the descriptive statistics for the JOL and RCJ bias scores 
for both conditions are given in Table 4.3. Distributions of the course exams, and the post-test 
scores for both similar calculational and conceptual transfer problems were not normally 
distributed, therefore Kruskal-Wallis tests were performed to investigate differences between the 
conditions. No difference in physics ability was found between the conditions, χ2(1) = 0.03, p = 
0.86. In addition, the difference in the post-test scores between conditions were not significant 
for either similar calculational problems, χ2(1) = 0.48, p = 0.49, or conceptual transfer problems, 
χ2(1) = 0.01, p = 0.97.   
Table 4.2. Mean Performance, RCJs, and JOLs on the Pre and Post Assessments by Condition 
 Attempt First  Watch Only 
Measure M SD  M SD 
Exam 1/2 AVG 62.2 12.4  61.9 11.9 
Pre-test      
   Performance 30.8 25.2  ̶ ̶ 
   Confidence 45.3 24.1  ̶ ̶ 
Post-test Performance      
   Similar 55.0 29.4  60.9 21.5 
   Transfer 39.4 20.8  40.1 20.8 
Post-test RCJs      
   Similar 53.2 25.5  52.9 14.8 
   Transfer 66.5 26.2  65.6 11.2 
JOLs 78.4 15.7  65.4 15.5 
Note: Attempt First (N = 26), Watch Only (N = 34) 
The distribution of the JOL and RCJ bias scores were normally distributed, and 
homogeneity of regression could be assumed. Therefore, to investigate how attempting to solve 




ability, three analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) were conducted with the bias scores as the 
between-subjects variable and the course exam average as the covariate. Effect sizes were 
calculated using partial eta squared, which represents the proportion of the total variance 
uniquely accounted for by each variable. Partial eta squared values of 0.01, 0.06, and 0.14 are 
considered small, medium, and large respectively (Cohen, 1988). 
Table 4.3. Means and Standard Deviations for JOL Bias and RCJ Bias by Condition 
 Attempt First  Watch Only 
Measure M SD  M SD 
JOL Bias 23.4 26.2  4.6 20.0 
Similar RCJ Bias -1.8 23.5  -7.9 18.7 
Transfer RCJ Bias 27.1 22.8  25.5 21.3 
Note: Attempt First (N = 26), Watch Only (N = 34) 
Participants in the “attempt first” condition were more overconfident in making JOLs 
than participants in the “view only” condition, F(1, 57) = 11.70, p = 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.15, 
controlling for physics ability. In addition, JOL bias was related to physics ability, F(1, 57) = 
9.89, p = 0.003, ηp
2 = 0.13, as participants with lower exam averages were more overconfident in 
making JOLs than participants with higher exam averages across groups. 
Participants in both conditions were slightly underconfident when making RCJs for 
similar calculational problems. However, there was not a significant difference in RCJ bias 
between the conditions, F(1, 57) = 1.54, p = 0.21, ηp
2 = 0.02. The accuracy of the RCJs for 
calculational problems was related to physics ability, F(1, 57) = 9.86, p = 0.002, ηp
2 = 0.14, as 
participants with lower exam averages were more overconfident in making RCJs than 
participants with higher exam averages.  
Participants in both conditions were much less accurate in making RCJs for conceptual 
transfer problems, as they were overconfident by more than 25 percentage points. However, 





0.01. In addition, the accuracy of the RCJs for conceptual transfer problems was not related to 
physics ability, F(1, 57) = 1.42, p = 0.23, ηp
2 = 0.02. 
Discussion  
 It was expected that the experience of attempting to solve the problem before viewing the 
solution would allow students to identify the components of the problem that they did not 
understand, thus allowing them to focus on learning the content applicable to their needs. 
Contrary to expectations, students who attempted to solve the problems before viewing the 
solutions did not score higher on the post-test than students who only viewed the solutions. 
However, the material covered by the ANSVs in Experiment 2 are typically some of the most 
difficult material in the course for students to master. Given the low scores on the pretest and the 
difficulty of the material, the lack of a difference on the post-test between the conditions may 
suggest that having students attempt problems that they are initially unable to make progress in 
solving is not beneficial for learning. Experiment 3 explores this possibility by using participants 
with a wider ability range, and material from Experiment 1, which is typically easier for students 
to learn.  
 Additionally, students in the “view only” condition did not have the benefit of practice 
and feedback that students in the “attempt first” condition did. The similar performance on the 
post-test for students in both conditions suggests that the learning gains observed in Experiment 
1 were likely due the result of viewing ANSVs and not simply from receiving feedback after 
practice. 
 Although attempting problems before viewing solutions did not lead to higher scores on 
the post-test, attempting the problems before viewing the solutions may have led students to be 




participants in the “attempt first” condition were overconfident by about 23 percentage points, 
compared to a four-and-a-half percentage point overconfidence in the “view only” condition. In 
other words, the participants who attempted to solve the problems before viewing the ANSVs 
were much more overconfident in their ability to solve similar problems to the problems in the 
videos, even though they were largely unsuccessful initially. It may be that the increased 
familiarity of the surface features that comes from attempting solve the problems initially may 
result in increased processing fluency and may lead to an “illusion of understanding,” similar to 
the findings from Carpenter, et al. (2013) and Serra and Magreehan (2016) who found that 
students are more confident after viewing fluent video lectures than disfluent lectures even 
though the two lecture videos do not lead to differential learning.  
 However, the overconfidence of the “attempt first” group exhibited after viewing the 
ANSVs was largely not present after attempting to solve the new calculational problems, as 
participants in both conditions were similarly underconfident when making RCJs for similar 
calculational problems. While students were relatively accurate in their RCJs for calculational 
problems, they were overconfident in both conditions by more than 25 percentage points on the 
conceptual transfer problems. Students in the “attempt first” condition did not have lower RCJ 
bias scores, and had higher JOL bias scores than the students in the “watch only” condition. This 
suggests that the improvements in metacognitive calibration seen in the “attempt first” condition 
and in Experiment 1 were not simply due to the underconfidence with practice effect.  
Experiment 3 
Participants 
An email was sent to all students enrolled in the introductory mechanics course. Seventy-




physics problems before viewing the solution videos or to only watch the solution videos without 
attempting the problems. Of these students, 49 students completed both sessions; 21 in the 
attempt problem first condition, and 28 in the view the solution only condition. Only the data 
from the participants who completed both sessions were included in the data analysis.  
Procedure  
The procedures for each condition were identical to the procedures described in 
Experiment 2. However, the questions on the pre- and post-tests were the questions and solutions 
used in Experiment 1, which covered material from the second course exam (Appendix B). In 
addition, students viewed solutions for both calculational and conceptual problems as in 
Experiment 1. The procedure for scoring the calculational and conceptual problems were the 
same as in Experiments 1 and 2. All of the questions were scored by two independent graders 
with an initial interrater agreement of 96%. Following discussion, 100% agreement was reached.  
One student did not make a JOL after viewing the videos during one session. This student 
was not included in the JOL analyses, but was included in all other analyses. While students in 
general provided RCJs after attempting every problem on the pre- and post-tests, about 25% of 
students failed to make an RCJ on at least one question. Only 2.8% of the individual questions 
did not have RCJs, and the percentage of missing RCJs ranged from 0% for most questions to 
6% for four questions on the post-test. There were no patterns in the missing data, nor did 
missingness correlate with any dependent variable used in the study, therefore the data was 
assumed to be missing at random. Complete data was available was available for 75%, therefore 







Descriptive statistics for course exam grades, performance on the pre- and post-tests, 
JOLs, and RCJs are given in Table 4.4. Table 4.5 presents the descriptive statistics for the 
calculational and conceptual questions separately. Distributions of scores on the first course 
exam, and the overall post-test scores were normally distributed, therefore independent-samples 
t-test were performed to investigate differences between the conditions. No differences were 
found between the conditions for physics ability, t(47) = 0.51, p = 0.61, or overall post-test 
scores, t(47) = 1.59, p = 0.12. To investigate the effect of attempting problems before viewing 
the ANSVs for different problem types, the calculational and conceptual questions were 
investigated separately. Distributions for both calculational and conceptual problems were not 
normally distributed, therefore Kruskal-Wallis tests were performed to investigate differences 
between the conditions. The conditions did not differ for conceptual problems, χ2(1) = 0.68, p = 
0.41. However, participants in the “attempt-first” group scored marginally higher on the post-test 
calculational problems, χ2(1) = 3.80, p = 0.052. 
Table 4.4. Mean Overall Performance, RCJs, and JOLs on the Pre- and Post-Tests by 
Condition 
 Attempt First  Watch Only 
Measure M SD  M SD 
Course Exam 1 72.2 16.1  69.9 15.0 
Pre-test Performance 62.8 25.4  ̶ ̶ 
Pre-test RCJs 63.7 16.3  ̶ ̶ 
Post-test Performance 83.5 11.7  77.6 14.4 
Post-test RCJs 80.7 10.7  77.8 14.7 
JOLs 86.5 18.7  81.1 13.9 
Note: Attempt First (N = 21), Watch Only (N = 28) 
Descriptive statistics for the JOL and RCJ bias scores for both conditions are given in 
Table 4.6. The distribution of the JOL and RCJ bias scores were normally distributed, and 




problems before viewing ANSVs affected the accuracy of JOLs and RCJs, three ANCOVAs 
were conducted with the bias scores as the between-subjects variable and the score from the 
course exam as the covariate.  
Table 4.5. Mean Performance, RCJs, and JOLs on the Pre and Post Assessments by Condition 
 Attempt First  Watch Only 
Measure M SD  M SD 
Pre-test Calculational Problems      
   Performance 58.7 28.2  ̶ ̶ 
   RCJ  60.1 19.0  ̶ ̶ 
Pre-test Conceptual Problems      
   Performance 67.6 27.9  ̶ ̶ 
   RCJ  68.1 15.7  ̶ ̶ 
Post-test Calculational Problems      
   Performance 90.5 13.5  83.9 13.2 
   RCJ 79.1 14.2  76.5 16.1 
Post-test Conceptual Problems      
   Performance 75.2 19.9  70.0 19.9 
   RCJ 82.6 10.3  79.4 16.1 
Note: Attempt First (N = 21), Watch Only (N = 28) 
A single outlier was identified in the “attempt-first” condition whose JOL bias was more 
than 30 percentage points below the next lowest bias. This individual was removed from the 
analysis of JOL accuracy5. The ANCOVAs indicated that there was not a significant difference 
in JOL bias between the conditions, F(1, 45) = 0.35, p = 0.56, ηp
2 = 0.01, nor was JOL accuracy 
related to physics ability, F(1, 45) = 0.06, p = 0.81, ηp
2 < 0.01. Participants in both conditions 
were relatively accurate when making RCJs when averaged over all 11 questions. There was not 
a significant difference in overall RCJ bias between the conditions, F(1, 45) = 0.23, p = 0.63, ηp
2 
< 0.01, however, overall RCJ accuracy was marginally related to physics ability, as participants 
                                                 
5 The results of the ANCOVA are similar with this individual included in the analysis, however 
including this individual results in a heterogeneity of regression (i.e., the relationship between 
the dependent variable and the covariate differing significantly between the conditions), which 
violates the assumptions for ANCOVA. The individual was removed from the ANCOVA 




with lower course exam scores were more overconfident in making RCJs than participants with 
lower exam scores F(1, 45) = 3.69, p = 0.054, ηp
2 = 0.07.  
Table 4.6. Mean RCJ Bias and JOL Bias on the Post-Test by Condition 
 Attempt First  Watch Only 
Measure M SD  M SD 
JOL Bias 3.0 19.1  3.5 15.2 
Overall RCJ Bias -2.8 15.9  0.2 18.3 
Calculational RCJ Bias -11.3 21.8  -7.5 17.1 
Conceptual RCJ Bias 7.4 19.9  9.4 24.7 
Note: Attempt First (N = 21), Watch Only (N = 28) 
Participants in both conditions were underconfident by about ten percentage points when 
making RCJs for calculational problems, and overconfident by about eight percentage points 
when making RCJs for conceptual problems. The conditions did not differ in RCJ bias for 
calculational problems, F(1, 45) = 0.31, p = 0.57, ηp
2 = 0.01, or for conceptual problems, F(1, 
45) = 0.05, p = 0.82, ηp
2 < 0.01. In addition, RCJ accuracy for calculational problems was related 
to physics ability, as participants with higher course exam scores were more underconfident in 
making RCJs than participants with lower exam scores, F(1, 45) = 4.37, p = 0.04, ηp
2 = 0.09. 
However, RCJ accuracy for conceptual problems was not related to physics ability, F(1, 45) = 
1.17, p = 0.28, ηp
2 = 0.03. 
Discussion 
 In contrast to Experiment 2, students who attempted the problems before viewing the 
video solutions scored marginally higher than students who only viewed the solutions for 
calculational problems on the post-test, but not for conceptual problems. This supports the 
hypothesis that attempting to solve problems before viewing solution videos may be beneficial 
for problems that are just above students’ current ability, but may not be useful for problems that 
are more difficult. Also, in contrast to Experiment 2, participants in the two conditions did not 




overconfident by about three percentage points. However, part of the reason for the good 
calibration may have been the high post test scores for the calculational problems given that the 
mean post-test score for the calculational problems for the “attempt-first” condition was over 90. 
This does not leave much room for students to overpredict. Additionally, unlike Experiment 2, 
students were asked to make a single JOL even though they viewed solutions for both 
calculational and conceptual problems. If attempting the problems before viewing leads to 
overconfidence for one type of problem but not the other, this method for making JOLs may 
obscure any differences in JOL calibration.  
General Discussion 
 Prior work has demonstrated that students like to use and learn how to solve calculational 
problems from worked examples during initial learning (LeFevre & Dixon, 1986; Recker & 
Pirolli, 1995; Sweller & Cooper, 1985; Ward & Sweller, 1990), and when reviewing for exams 
(Mestre, Morphew, & Gladding, 2015), especially when paired with problem solving (Trafton & 
Reiser, 1993). This study extends the prior work by demonstrating across all three experiments, 
that low-performing students learned from animated worked examples for both calculational and 
conceptual physics problems. In addition, students were more accurate in monitoring their 
understanding as measured by lower RCJ bias. The similarity between conditions in Experiments 
2 and 3 suggest that these improvements were likely due to the information provided in the video 
solutions and not simply from attempting the problems and receiving correctness feedback. 
 Students who attempted the problems before viewing the video solutions were 
overconfident in their JOLs for difficult material (Experiment 2), but not for easier material 
(Experiment 3). This is a potentially important finding for students within self-regulated learning 




from future studying (Metcalfe & Finn, 2008). It may be that attempting to solve problems 
before viewing the ANSV reduces extrinsic cognitive load without increasing germane cognitive 
load, leading to greater feelings of fluency when viewing the ANSV than students who did not 
know the problem before viewing. When working with difficult content, this greater fluency is 
not diagnostic of learning, leading students to become overconfident. However, when working 
with easier content the fluency is more diagnostic of learning leading students to make more 
accurate judgments. Alternatively, students in the “attempt-first” condition were not able to 
demonstrate overconfidence because the scores were near ceiling. Future work should investigate 
the cause of the overconfidence by varying the difficult of the problems shown in the ANSVs.  
 Finally, across all three experiments students were more overconfident in making RCJs 
for conceptual problems compared to calculational problems, even though they scored higher on 
the calculational problems on the post-tests. One reason for this pattern may be that individuals 
often hold the belief that conceptual problems are easier to solve than calculational problems in 
physics (Fakcharoenphol, Morphew, & Mestre, 2015). In addition, students often hold robust 
misconceptions for conceptual questions for which the intuitive answer is not correct. These 
findings suggest that it is important to incorporate worked-examples for both calculational and 
conceptual problems to help students prepare for exams that require students to use both 
computational and conceptual solutions.  
 While students appear to benefit from worked examples, the extent to which students are 
able to learn from worked examples depends on how well they provide correct self-explanations 
of the solutions and the underlying conceptual understanding to themselves (Chi, et al., 1989). 
However, learners often do not spontaneously engage in productive self-explanation of the steps 




spontaneous self-explanation could be that novices and low-performing students do not have the 
baseline knowledge required for elaborate self-explanation. These underprepared students may 
benefit from solutions which make explicit the rationale, theories, and implicit thought process 
that an expert utilizes when producing a solution. Future work should investigate the effect of 
methods using technique that involve more active learning that can increase the germane 
cognitive load. For example, using examples that require students to elaborate or self-explain the 
material (Renkl, Stark, Gruber, & Mandl, 1998; van Merrienboer, Schuurman, De Croock, & 
Paas, 2002), that engage in analogical comparison (Badeau, et al., 2017), or that use adaptive 
fading of worked-examples (Atkinson, et al., 2003; Salden, et al., 2010).  
 Finally, prior work has demonstrated that providing students with instruction and training 
in making accurate self-assessment leads to better performance and greater monitoring accuracy 
(Azevedo & Cromley, 2004; Kostons, Paas, & van Gog, 2009), but providing students with only 
feedback on their accuracy can lead to greater overconfidence and less effective metacognitive 
control (Raaijmakers, Baars, Paas, van Merrenboer, & van Gog, 2019). Given these findings, 
future work should investigate the effect that metacognitive training and feedback has on the 




CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
In this dissertation, I examined metacognitive monitoring accuracy of students preparing 
for exams in introductory STEM courses (1) to examine differences in monitoring accuracy and 
awareness between students of different abilities; (2) to investigate changes in students’ 
monitoring accuracy over the course of a semester; (3) to identify any predictor variables related 
to both the initial accuracy or the change in accuracy over time; and (4) to explore the effect that 
accuracy feedback and viewing solution videos has on performance and monitoring accuracy. 
In the first study (Chapter 2), I investigated the robustness of the inverse relationship 
between domain ability and metacognitive calibration within the domain. I also explored the 
extent to which metacognitive awareness differed by domain ability by looking at metacognitive 
adjustments made in exam predictions. In the second study (Chapter 3), I examined changes in 
metacognitive calibration over the course of four exams, as well as the effect of feedback on 
metacognitive calibration. Finally, in the third study (Chapter 4), I presented findings from three 
experiments that studied the effect of viewing solution videos on the performance and 
metacognitive calibration of students in an introductory physics course. In this chapter, I review 
the key findings, discuss limitations of the current studies, and propose directions for future 
research. 
Summary of Findings 
As a whole, this dissertation investigates metacognitive monitoring within self-regulated 
learning environments, and is situated at the junction between cognitive psychology and 
discipline-based education research. The findings presented in the preceding chapters extend 
existing research concerning differences in metacognitive awareness and accuracy (Händel & 




calibration over time (Foster, et al., 2017; Hacker, Bol, & Bahbahani, 2008; Miller, & Geraci, 
2011b), and the effect of monitoring accuracy feedback and worked-examples on learning and 
metacognitive calibration (Belski & Belski, 2013; Mestre, Morphew, & Gladding, 2015; Rourke 
& Sweller, 2009; van Gog, Kester, & Paas, 2011). 
In Chapter 2, I documented the inverse relationship between ability within a domain and 
metacognitive calibration within the domain (e.g., Kruger & Dunning, 1999). To examine the 
robustness of the findings, I examined metacognitive calibration by having students predict their 
exam grade both before and after taking exams across two introductory physics courses with 
quite different populations. In addition, I used two different measures of calibration. I found that, 
on every exam, high-performing students were less overconfident, and more accurate overall in 
predicting their exam grades compared to lower-performing students.  
The extent to which this pattern can be explained by the lack of metacognitive awareness 
is not yet established in the literature. Because it is unclear from prior work whether low-
performing students are “unskilled and unaware” (e.g., Schlosser, et al., 2013) or simply 
“unskilled but subjectively aware” (e.g., Miller & Geraci, 2011a), I examined how individual 
students made changes to the predictions after taking an exam. I found that low-performing 
students made correct metacognitive adjustments as frequently as high-performing students. 
However, low-performing students were less likely to adjust their metacognitive judgments so 
that their postdictions were either within five percentage points of their actual performance, or 
reduced their miscalibration by at least 50% compared to high-performing students in both 
classes. In addition, low-performing students made larger metacognitive adjustments than high-
performing only in the course for physics and engineering majors, even though their initial 




needed to accurately monitor one’s performance are the same as those needed for accurate 
performance in the first place (Ehrlinger, Johnson, Banner, Dunning, & Kruger, 2008, 2008; 
Händel & Dresel, 2018). In addition, the lowest-performing students do not appear to be aware 
of their initial miscalibration.   
In Chapter 3, I investigated changes in metacognitive calibration for exam predictions 
within an introductory physics course using the prediction bias across four exams. In addition, I 
examined the effect of providing students with feedback about the accuracy of their predictions 
on the change in metacognitive bias. I found that both initial bias, and the change in bias over 
time, varies greatly amongst individuals similar to previous studies using person-centered 
techniques (Foster, et al., 2017). I extend the previous work in this area by utilizing growth 
mixture modeling to identify groups of individuals with similar changes in metacognitive bias 
over the course of a semester. The results from the growth mixture modeling suggest that there 
were four patterns for change in bias over the four exams, only one of which demonstrated 
improvement in bias over the course of the semester. 
Academic ability, as measured by course exam scores, was a significant predictor for the 
pattern of bias change an individual exhibited. Specifically, the lowest performing students were 
the least accurate, and maintained a consistent overconfidence, while the highest performing 
individuals were initially most accurate and tended towards underconfidence on later exams. 
Students who demonstrated improvement in metacognitive bias were most likely to be the 
middle two-quartiles of exam average. The improved metacognitive accuracy for these students 
was the result of both improvements in exam performance and lowered exam predictions. 
However, while theories of self-regulated learning suggest that accurate metacognitive 




Hofer, 2004; Kitchner, 1983; Winne & Hadwin, 1998), a relationship was not found between 
these constructs and changes in metacognitive bias.  
Providing students with feedback about the accuracy of their exam predictions did not 
result in improvements in monitoring accuracy. In fact, the lowest-performing students made less 
accurate predictions on the final exam if they received accuracy feedback. Giving students 
accuracy feedback can give them an indication of how they are doing, but it does not help them 
to incorporate different study strategies. Feedback may prompt students to engage in additional 
studying using the same, largely ineffective, methods they were using, becoming more confident 
in the process. This is in line with students’ reluctance to change their study strategies even when 
their current strategies are not successful (Blasiman, Dunlosky, & Rawson, 2017). This suggests 
that interventions aimed at improving metacognitive monitoring may need to incorporate 
components aimed at improving other aspects of metacognition, such as metacognitive control 
and knowledge. 
 Motivated by research showing that active learning and problem solving are best for 
learning, Chapter 4 examined the effect of viewing solution videos on problem-solving and 
metacognitive monitoring accuracy. Results from three experiments indicate that students learn 
from the solution videos and make more accurate confidence judgments for problems that are 
similar to the problems in the video solutions. These effects are not likely due to practice and 
feedback effects, because students who do not attempt the problems before viewing the solutions 
exhibit similar performance and confidence when attempting problems similar to the problems 
presented in the video solutions. However, students are overconfident after attempting to solve 
conceptual transfer problems. In addition, students are overconfident after viewing the solutions 




performing students, that the familiarity of the problems’ surface features may result in increased 
feelings of fluency when viewing video solutions. Students may then use these nondiagnostic 
metacognitive cues when assessing the extent to which they have learned from the video, leading 
to misplaced overconfidence. 
The findings from these three studies have both theoretical and practical implications. 
From a theoretical perspective, this dissertation further establishes the robustness of the inverse 
relationship between domain ability and metacognitive monitoring accuracy within the domain 
(Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004; Schlosser, et al., 2013). The findings also provide further 
evidence that the lowest-performing students are largely unaware of the extent of their 
metacognitive miscalibration (Händel & Dresel, 2018; Kruger & Dunning, 1999). In addition, 
the lack of a significant relationship between metacognitive bias or change in metacognitive bias 
and academic goal orientation, theories of intelligence, and epistemological beliefs suggest that 
the relationship between these constructs needs to be more closely examined in view of theories 
of self-regulated learning (e.g., Hofer, 2004; Kitchner, 1983; Winne & Hadwin, 1998). 
This dissertation also provides practical implications for both research on metacognitive 
monitoring accuracy, and for the design of self-regulated learning environments. The significant 
variation in the trajectories of metacognitive bias over the course of a semester, along with the 
clustering of patterns suggest that studies investigating changes in metacognitive calibration 
should use person-centered techniques such as growth mixture modeling to better identify 
constructs associated with accurate monitoring or improvement in monitoring accuracy. In 
addition, these studies highlight the need for comprehensive interventions to help low-
performing students both monitor the learning, but to also develop availing metacognitive 




Limitations and Future Directions 
The studies presented in this dissertation furthers our understanding of metacognitive 
monitoring and awareness in self-regulated learning contexts. However, as with all research, 
these studies had limitations in the methods and design that need to be kept in mind when 
interpreting the findings. In Chapters 2 and 3 not all students made predictions and postdictions 
for every exam. I acknowledge that not requiring students to make predictions and postdictions 
for every exam may affect the results of the metacognitive adjustment analyses. It may be that 
low-performing students who scored lower than expected were less likely to make metacognitive 
judgments after taking the exam because they performed worse than expected on the exam. If 
students opted to not make predictions for this reason, this could potentially be an indicator of 
metacognitive awareness. In addition, not all students completed the questionnaires measuring 
students’ epistemological beliefs, academic goal orientations, and theories of intelligence. 
Although there was not an obvious pattern in the missingness of the data, the smaller sample size 
resulted in less power to detect differences between the trajectories of metacognitive change.  
Another limitation of the methodology used in Chapters 2 and 3 is that the course exams 
were created by the instructors teaching the introductory physics courses who were not part of 
the research study. While this situated the studies within an authentic context, and provided 
ecological validity to the studies, this set up did not allow for the control of exam difficulty. 
While, students tend not to use prior exam performance when predicting future exam scores 
(Foster, et al., 2017), it is useful for exam difficulty to be relatively constant when attempting to 
measure changes in metacognitive monitoring accuracy over the course of a semester. An 
additional limitation of the course exams used in the study was the multiple-choice design of the 




usually included as distractors, which may have reduced the metacognitive adjustments made by 
the low-performing students. With these limitations in mind, future research should attempt to 
examine changes in metacognitive monitoring using course exams that are designed to be 
consistent in difficulty and length across a semester. This would allow studies to examine 
whether low-performing students are able to use prior exam information when making 
predictions over the course of a semester. Future research would also benefit from examining the 
effect that the type of exam question (i.e., open-ended, multiple-choice, etc) has on 
metacognitive calibration. In addition, future research should consider engaging students in 
making item-level judgments of learning and confidence judgments, in order investigate 
overconfidence at a more fine-grained level. 
An additional shortcoming across the studies was that the studies solely focused on the 
calibration of students’ metacognitive monitoring. Future research would benefit from more 
comprehensive study designs that investigate the relationship between metacognitive judgments 
and studying behavior in authentic contexts. By examining the relationship between particular 
studying behaviors and metacognitive calibration within different contexts, it may be possible to 
design effective comprehensive interventions that are able to identify students at risk of 
demonstrating illusions of understanding, and to provide students with content- and context-
specific studying strategies. 
Conclusion 
In this dissertation, I presented findings from three studies investigating the 
metacognitive monitoring accuracy of introductory physics students within self-regulated 
learning contexts. By examining potential predictors of metacognitive monitoring accuracy, I 




understanding.” In addition, I investigated the effect that common, and low-cost, interventions 
aimed at helping struggling students have on the accuracy of their metacognitive monitoring. 
This is particularly important for large-enrollment courses that are typical of introductory STEM 
courses at large universities. Taken together, these studies set the stage from which future 
research can study interventions aimed at helping hard-working, yet struggling students to 
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APPENDIX B: ASSESSMENTS FOR CHAPTER 4 EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 3 
Pre-Test Questions 
 
1) A system is composed of three small masses arranged along the x axis as shown. A mass M
1
 = 
3 kg is located at x
1
 = -2 m, a mass M
2
 = 1 kg is located at x
2
 = -1 m, and a mass M
3
 = 2 kg is 
located at x
3
 = 2 m. A force of 18 N is applied to M
3
, the 2 kg mass, directed in the positive y-
direction and a force of 24 N is applied to M
1
, the 3 kg mass, in the negative x-direction. What is 
the magnitude of the acceleration of the center of mass of the system? 
 
 
2) The force F3, on the 2 kg mass, is now applied in a different direction as shown. How does 
|a
cm
| change, if at all, from the original situation in question 1? Circle your answer. 
 
a.  |𝑎𝑐𝑚| stays the same                      b.  |𝑎𝑐𝑚| increases                  c.  |𝑎𝑐𝑚| decreases 
 




3) A block of mass M = 1.4 kg is used to compress a spring of constant k = 23 N/m, a distance of 
d = 0.1 m, and then released from rest. The block slides along a frictionless surface, then collides 
and sticks to another block of mass m = 0.7 kg. Then the two masses enter a region of friction μ= 
0.25, as shown above.  
 








 4)  Compare TE(0), the total energy of the system just before M is released, to TE(after),  the 
total energy of M+m after the collision. Circle your answer. 
 
 
a.  𝑇𝐸(0) < 𝑇𝐸(𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟)      b.  𝑇𝐸(0) = 𝑇𝐸(𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟)      c.  𝑇𝐸(0) > 𝑇𝐸(𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟) 
 









5) A block of mass m = 0.3 kg is hung on a spring with constant k = 60 N/m, reaching 
equilibrium when the length of the stretched spring is L = 1.6 m. The block is then pulled down a 
distance of H
o

























6)  Suppose the mass, m, is replaced by a mass m’ = 2m. The spring now reaches equilibrium 
when the length of the stretched spring is L’. The block is then pulled down the same distance, 
H
o
, as in the prior problem and released from rest. Compare TE’(v’=v’max), the total energy of the 
system at the time when m’ achieves its maximum speed, to TE(v=vmax), the total energy of the 
system at the time when m achieved its maximum speed. Circle your answer and explain your 
reasoning. 
 
a.  𝑇𝐸’(𝑣’ = 𝑣’𝑚𝑎𝑥) < 𝑇𝐸(𝑣 = 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥)       
b.  𝑇𝐸’(𝑣’ = 𝑣’𝑚𝑎𝑥) = 𝑇𝐸(𝑣 = 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥)       
c.  𝑇𝐸’(𝑣’ = 𝑣’𝑚𝑎𝑥) > 𝑇𝐸(𝑣 = 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥) 






7) Two carts of mass M
1
 = 0.15 kg and M
2
 = 0.3 kg are on a one-dimensional horizontal 
frictionless air track. Cart 1 moves to the right at speed v
1
 = 0.28 m/s towards cart 2. The two 
carts have an elastic collision; the velocity of the center of mass of the two carts after the 
collision is v
cm

















8)  Suppose the mass of Cart 2, M2, is now unknown but all the other quantities in the problem 
remain the same. What statement below about the direction of the initial velocity of M2, is most 
accurate? 
 
a. The direction of the initial velocity of M2 is toward the right, 
b. The direction of the initial velocity of M2 is toward the left, 
c. The direction of the initial velocity of M2 can be toward the right or toward the left. 
 






9)  A shell is shot out of a vertical cannon on the moon and it reaches a height of R/2 from the 
surface of the moon before momentarily stopping, where R is the radius of the moon.   
Which equation below, when solved for Vi, would give you the initial speed of the shell? In the 
expressions below, G is the universal gravitational constant, M is the mass of the moon, and m is 




































































10) Suppose the exact event took place on a dwarf planet having the same mass, but a larger 
radius than the moon. The shell still rises to RP/2 from the surface of the dwarf planet. How 
would the new initial speed, VP, compare to Vi from the previous problem? 
 
 
a. VP =Vi         b.  VP > Vi            c. VP < Vi 
 
 





11) A block of mass M= 0.8 kg is released from a height H = 0.36 m on a frictionless ramp 
making an angle θ = 27° as shown. At the bottom of the ramp the block passes through a 
frictional region of length D = 0.15 m that has a coefficient of kinetic friction μ = 0.2. At the end 














What is the maximum compression of the spring the first time that the block comes into contact 















1) A block of mass m = 0.45 kg is released from rest on a frictionless ramp at height h = 0.3 m. 
When block m reaches the horizontal region, it has a totally inelastic collision with a block of 
mass M = 1.2 kg, and then the two blocks travel together into a rough region with a coefficient of 
kinetic friction μ = 0.25. What total distance D do the blocks travel in the region of friction? 
 
 
2)  Suppose we interchange the initial positions of m and M (i.e., M is released from rest from 
height h and collides with a stationary m on the horizontal region. How does D’, the new 
distance travelled in the rough region, compare to the original distance D? Circle your answer. 
 
 
a.  𝐷′ > 𝐷        b.  𝐷′ < 𝐷        c.  𝐷′ = 𝐷 
 
Explain your reasoning 
 
 
3) A system is composed of three small masses arranged along the x axis as shown. A mass M
1
 = 
2 kg is located at (-3m, 0m), a mass M
2
 = 3 kg is located at (0m, 2m), and a mass M
3
 = 1 kg is 
located at (2m, 1m). A force of 20 N is applied to M
2
, the 3 kg mass, directed in the positive x-
direction and a force of 20 N is applied to M
1
, the 2 kg mass, in the positive y-direction. What is 















4) The force, F, on the 4 kg mass, is applied in a different direction as shown. How does |a
cm
| 




a.  |𝑎𝑐𝑚| increases  b.  |𝑎𝑐𝑚| decreases  c.  |𝑎𝑐𝑚| stays the same 
 
Explain your reasoning 
 
5) A block of mass m = 0.36 kg is attached to a spring with constant k = 28 N/m. The block 
compresses the spring by a distance of 0.21 m from its equilibrium position and then is released 
from rest. What is the speed of the block when it is stretching the spring by a distance of 0.05 m 





6) Suppose the mass m is replaced by a mass m’ = 2m. Compare TE’(v’=v’max), the total energy 
of the system at the time when m’ achieves its maximum speed, to TE(v=vmax), the total energy 
of the system at the time when m achieved its maximum speed. Circle your answer. 
 
a.  𝑇𝐸’(𝑣’ = 𝑣’𝑚𝑎𝑥) > 𝑇𝐸(𝑣 = 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥)       
b.  𝑇𝐸’(𝑣’ = 𝑣’𝑚𝑎𝑥) < 𝑇𝐸(𝑣 = 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥)       
c.  𝑇𝐸’(𝑣’ = 𝑣’𝑚𝑎𝑥) = 𝑇𝐸(𝑣 = 𝑣𝑚𝑎𝑥) 
 











7)  A block of mass M = 4 kg is used to compress a spring of constant k = 250 N/m by a distance 
of x = 0.35 m from its equilibrium position and then released from rest. The block then passes 
over a frictional region of length D = 0.25 m that has a coefficient of kinetic friction μ = 0.19. 
The block then encounters a frictionless ramp and climbs to its final height h. What is h, the 





8) Two carts move toward each other on a one-dimensional horizontal frictionless track. Cart 1 
has mass m1 = 6 kg and initial velocity V1,i =  1.0  m/s. Cart 2 has mass m2 = 
1
3
m1 = 2 kg and 
initial velocity V2,i =  −
𝑉1,𝑖
2
⁄  = - 0.5 m/s.   A spring between them makes the collision between 
the carts elastic. What is the final velocity of Cart 2 after the collision? Your answer should be 













𝑉1,𝑖 = 1𝑚/𝑠  
m/s 𝑉2,𝑖
= −0.5 𝑚/𝑠 
𝑚1
= 6 𝑘𝑔 𝑚2




9)  The spring is now removed and the carts approach each other with the same initial velocities, 
but now stick together and move together after the collision.  Which of the following diagrams 
best represents the final velocities of the carts in the center of mass frame? Circle your answer. 
 
 




10) A meteorite starts from rest a distance d above the surface of the Earth.  Which expression 
below would allow you to find the speed of the meteorite, V, just before hitting the surface of the 
Earth?  In the expressions below the mass of the Earth is ME, the radius of the Earth is RE and the 






























































11) Suppose the exact event took place on a different planet having the same radius as the earth 
but having a larger mass than the earth. As before the meteorite starts from rest a distance d 
above the surface of the planet. How would the new final speed of the meteorite before hitting 
the planet, Vnew, compare to V from the previous problem? 
 
b. Vnew = V         b.  Vnew > V            c. Vnew < V 
 












APPENDIX C: ASSESSMENTS FOR CHAPTER 4 EXPERIMENT 2 
Pre-Test Questions 
 
1) A disk of mass M=2 kg and radius R=0.2 m rests on top of a frictionless surface. String is 
wound around the rim of the disk, with one end of the string tied to a wall at the left-end of the 
frictionless surface. A second string attached to an axle on the middle of the disk is pulled with 
tension T= 9 N toward the right, causing a linear acceleration, a, toward the right as string 
unwinds from the rim, as well as an angular acceleration, α.  Find the linear acceleration, a, of 
the disk as it slides on the frictionless surface. 
 
 
2) A wheel (a solid disk) of mass M = 0.3 kg and radius R = 0.1700 m rests on a horizontal 
surface against a vertical step of height h = 0.0100 m.  A point below the center of the wheel is a 
distance x = 0.0575 m from the vertical step.  The wheel is to be raised over the step by a 
horizontal force F applied to the axle of the wheel as shown in the figure.  Find the minimum 
force, Fmin, needed to raise the wheel over the step. The figure is not to scale. 
 
 
3)  A beam of mass M = 20 kg and length L = 2 m is hung by two strings as shown. What is the 












4)  The beam in question 3 is used for this question. The string at the right is now cut. What is 




5) A solid ball of mass M = 0.25 kg and radius R = 10 cm is glued to the end of a rod of length L 
= 40 cm and mass m = 0.22 kg.  What is the moment of inertia of this object about a 
perpendicular axis a distance L/3 from the end of the rod, as shown. Express your answer in 
terms of L, R, M and m. 
 
 
6) A merry-go-round of radius R = 3 m and mass M = 200 kg rotates clockwise at angular 
velocity w = 0.6 rad/s. A child of mass m = 25 kg runs tangentially to the merry-go-round at 
speed v = 1.3 m/s and jumps onto the rim, as shown in the diagram; when the child lands she 
comes to rest on the rim. What is the final angular velocity of the merry-go-round after the child 
jumps on? Assume out of the screen is positive and into the screen is negative. 
 
 
7) A disk of mass M = 1.2 kg and radius R = 0.73 m has string wound around its rim. The disk is 
free to rotate about an axle through its center. The two ends of the axle are held fixed and the 
string is pulled tangentially to the rim of the disk with tension T = 87 N for 9 seconds. What is 






8) With the disk rotating with the angular speed you found in question 2, if the right end is now 




9)  A ladder of mass M=8 kg is placed against a wall as shown in the diagram. There is friction 
between the floor and the ladder but the wall is very slippery so you may consider it frictionless.  
The ladder is in equilibrium at the angle shown. What is the force of friction between the floor 















1) A solid disk of mass M = 0.47 kg and radius R = 30 cm is free to rotate about an axis through 
its center, with the axis of the disk supported by the ceiling. String is wound around the rim of 




2) Suppose instead that you remove the hanging mass, and now you grab the string and pull 
vertically down with a tension equal to mg. How does the angular acceleration of the disk now 
compare to that in the previous problem?  
 a. The new angular acceleration is larger than what it was in the previous problem  
 b. The new angular acceleration is smaller than what it was in the previous problem 
 c. The new angular acceleration is the same as what it was in the previous problem 
                Explain your reasoning: 
 
3)  In an action Hollywood movie, a truck balances on the edge of a cliff as shown. The point 
labeled A is the center of mass of the portion of the truck to the left of the dotted line, and 
similarly the point labeled B is the center of mass of the portion of the truck to the right of the 
dotted line. The truck has total mass M = 2,000 kg, with 1,450 kg of that mass concentrated at 
the center of mass labeled B and 550 kg of that mass concentrated at the center of mass labeled 
A. Point B is a distance d = 3 m horizontally directly to the right from the cliff edge, while point 
B is also the same distance d = 3 m from the edge of the cliff.  The action hero is positioned on 
the roof of the truck along the line from the edge of the cliff to A, but a distance 2d = 6 m away 
from the cliff’s edge.  In this configuration, the truck is perfectly balanced. What is the mass of 






4) A solid disk of mass M and radius R has a string attached to its edge, with the other end 
attached to a wall, as shown.  The string is attached to the rim so that it is perpendicular to a 
radius drawn from the center of the disk to the attachment point on the rim.  The disk rests in 
equilibrium in the configuration shown.  Gravity points down in the diagram. Draw a Free-Body 
Diagram for the disk. 
 
5) A bar called “Cloud 9 Lounge” has a sign outside its front door advertising its existence. The 
sign consists of a horizontal rod of length 2d hinged against a wall, with a cable attached to the 
end of the rod and to the wall a distance d = 2 m above the hinge. A solid disk of radius R = 0.75 
m is centered at the middle of the rod. Assume that the rod has a mass of 3 kg and the disk has 
mass 4 kg. Find the tension in the cable. 
 
 






7)  If instead the cable were attached at the top tip of the disk and its other end were attached to 
the wall at exactly the same place, how would the horizontal force provided by the hinge 
change? 
a) It would decrease  b) It would increase  c) It would stay the same 
 







8) Compute the moment of inertia of an object made up of a hoop of radius R and mass M with a 
uniform rod of mass m and length 2R that goes from one side of the rim to the other through the 
hoop’s center, as shown in the diagram. The axis or rotation (shown as a solid dot) is a distance 
of 2R/3 from the center of the hoop.  Express your answer in terms of M, m and R. 
 
 
9) A hoop with 5 spokes has 5 equal masses that can lock on to specific points along the spokes. 
In the configuration shown, the five masses are locked on half-way between the center and the 
rim of each spoke. This object is released from the top of a ramp and rolls down without slipping 
to the bottom of the ramp. If you want to increase the speed that this object would have at the 
bottom of the ramp, you would 
a. Move the 5 masses closer to the rim 
b. Move the 5 masses closer to the center 
c. You can’t increase the object’s speed at the bottom by moving the 5 masses. 
 
Explain your answer:  
 
 
10) For the irregularly-shaped object shown, put an “x” at the place where the moment of inertia 
would be the lowest value possible, and explain why you picked that point.  
 
 
11) A cannon is mounted on top of a large disk that is rotating clockwise with angular speed ω = 
4.2 rad/s as shown. The shell fired by the cannon has mass 80 kg, and the cannon is positioned so 
that it fires the shell horizontally and tangentially to the disk. The moment of inertia of the disk 
with the mounted cannon and cannonball loaded is I = 4,500 kg m2, and the shell is fired a 
distance 3 m from the center of the disk. At what speed must the cannonball be fired in order to 






12) Now suppose the cannon is mounted as shown, with the disk rotating clockwise with the 
same initial angular speed as in the previous problem. Explain what happens to the motion of the 
disk if the cannon now fires the same shell at the same speed as in the previous problem, but in 
the radial direction in which it is pointing. You may assume that the center of mass of the cannon 




13) A disk that is free to rotate about an axle through its center is mounted on a table as shown. 
String is wound around the disk and the string is pulled with tension T = 40 N in the direction 
shown for 5 seconds. The mass of the disk is M = 0.46 kg and its radius is R = 0.25 m. What is 




14) Through what total angle (in radians) has the disk in the previous question rotated at the end 





15) The rotating disk is now taken and hung from a string in the configuration shown.  In which 
direction does the free end of the axle precess? 




c) The right end precesses down  d) The right end precesses up 
     Explain your answer: 
 
16) A beam of mass M = 40 kg and length L = 3 m is pivoted on a wall, and has a cable attached 
to it at a right angle with its other end attached to the wall, as shown. The angle between the 




17) Explain whether the tension in the cable increases, decreases, or stays the same, if it is 
attached closer to the end of the beam (that is, at a point farther than 2L/3 from the pivot). 
Assume that the cable is still attached at a right angle to the beam. 
 
a) The tension would increase  
b) The tension would decrease 
c) The tension would stay the same 
     Explanation: 
 
 
 
